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I. INTRODUCTION 
Competence,1 advocacy,2 and ethics3 are the pillars of the practice of 
law; almost every professional obligation an attorney has flows from one of 
these three core concepts.4  An attorney must know the law.5  An attorney 
must advance his client’s position.6  An attorney must do so within the con-
fines of what his colleagues and community find acceptable.7  The concept of 
a lawyer has not changed much, but how we perceive the larger legal com-
munity’s adherence to these pillars frequently shifts.8 
  
 1. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012). 
 2. See id. R. 3.1–3.9. 
 3. See id. scope para. 16. 
 4. See id. R. 1.1, 3.1–3.9, scope para. 16. 
 5. E.g., id. R. 1.1 (“Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thor-
oughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”). 
 6. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 2 (“As advocate, a lawyer zeal-
ously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”); see also id. R. 
1.2(a) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representa-
tion . . . .”). 
 7. See, e.g., id. pmbl. para. 5 (“A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system 
and for those who serve [in] it, including judges, other lawyers, and public officials.”).  “Vir-
tually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer’s responsibilities to 
clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer’s own interest in remaining an ethical person 
while earning a satisfactory living.”  Id. pmbl. para. 9. 
 8. See Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to Be Civil:  Defining 
Civility as an Obligation of Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 103–07 (2011–
2012) (focusing on the rise and fall of civility and how it should be enforced going forward). 
Whether the increased size of the bar has decreased collegiality, or the legal profession has be-
come only a business, or experienced lawyers have ceased to teach new lawyers the standards 
to be observed, or because of other factors not readily categorized, we observe patterns of be-
havior that forebode ill for our system of justice. 
Dondi Props. Corp. v. Commerce Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 286 (N.D. Tex. 1988) 
(per curiam)); see also Campbell, supra note 8, at 102.  In fact, as the economy has down-
shifted, firms have switched practice areas or taken cases on in bulk, which has led to the 
same firms being penalized or sanctioned for failing to practice in an appropriate manner.  
See,e.g., Martha Neil, Federal Judge’s Unusual Order Puts Well-Known Bankruptcy Law 
Firm Under Fla. Bar Scrutiny, A.B.A. J. (June 16, 2011, 5:15 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/federal_judges_unusual_order_puts_well-
known_bankruptcy_law_firm_under_fla./ (firm banned from bankruptcy court for improper 
practice); Matt Chandler, Baum Settles with AG; Will Pay $4M, BUFFALO BUS. FIRST (Mar. 
22, 2012, 10:38 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/buffalo/news/2012/03/22/baum-settles-
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In theory, competence, advocacy, and ethics are all equally important—
each must be given due consideration and rarely should one be considered 
paramount to the other.9  But the way this practice paradigm has evolved 
sometimes leaves good lawyers—and some less than good lawyers—
struggling to find a balance between what can be done and what should be 
done.10 
This struggle comes into clear relief when considering the tension be-
tween advocacy and ethics.  An attorney may defame a party in a proceeding, 
as long as such defamation has some relation to the legal proceeding, and be 
immune from civil liability.11  Even if false statements were knowingly made 
with malice, the immunity protects the attorney in the name of unfettered 
zealous advocacy.12  The Rules of Professional Conduct, however, prohibit 
an attorney from “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice.”13  Professionalism demands even more—honesty and fair dealing.14  Is 
it fair to ask an attorney to weigh these competing interests without the bene-
fit of clear guidance, indeed, should an attorney be required to make these 
choices at all? 
Three competing but complementary obligations balance with these 
three core pillars of practice.15  The first obligation is to the client:  to zeal-
ously represent the client, to hold that client’s confidences inviolate, and to 
serve the client’s needs.16  Second, an attorney has an obligation as an officer 
of the court.17  An attorney must understand that the overarching need for 
justice may come before an individual client’s needs, and that the attorney 
has a personal obligation to support and defend the judicial system.18  Third, 
  
with-ag-will-pay-4m.html?page=all (firm improperly conducted high-volume foreclosure 
practice by improperly authenticating documents and taking other inappropriate shortcuts). 
 9. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 3.1–3.9, pmbl. paras. 2, 9, scope para. 
16. 
 10. See id. scope para. 16; Campbell, supra note 8, at 104–07. 
 11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1977). 
 12. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 114, at 
817 (5th ed. 1984); T. Leigh Anenson, Absolute Immunity from Civil Liability:  Lessons for 
Litigation Lawyers, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 915, 918 (2004). 
 13. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d).  One would think defaming someone 
with malice would be prejudicial to the administration of justice, even if the purpose was to 
engage in the most complete form of advocacy. 
 14. See id. R. 8.4(b)–(e). 
 15. Id. pmbl. paras. 1, 8; see Mike Hoeflich & J. Nick Badgerow, The Regulation of 
Courtesy:  Does Kansas Need a Code of Professionalism?, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 413, 416 
(2011). 
 16. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a), pmbl. paras. 2, 8. 
 17. See id. R. 3.3. 
 18. See, e.g., id. R. 3.3(b). 
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the attorney has an obligation to the public.19  The attorney should embrace 
his obligation to serve those who would not otherwise have access to the law, 
and to create in the public a confidence in those who serve as attorneys.20 
Reconciling these affirmative obligations to three very distinct audienc-
es can be difficult.  Over the years, rules of professional conduct have 
evolved from little more than civility codes to a complete body of law that 
helps define the outer boundaries of how these relationships interact with one 
another.21  More importantly, the rules of professional conduct, as they have 
evolved, have given guidance to lawyers to offer the floor below which no 
lawyer may fall.22  But, because the rules only provide a floor, the legal 
community has acknowledged that professionalism requires more than mere 
compliance.23  Since the rules do not define an ideal standard of professional-
ism, lawyers must step up from the minimum requirements in executing their 
  
 19. Id. R. 6.1 (encouraging voluntary pro bono public service), R. 6.2 (accepting ap-
pointments by the court to represent indigent clients), pmbl. para. 6. 
 20. Id. R. 6.1, pmbl. paras. 6–7. 
 21. See Campbell, supra note 8, at 128–37.  In his article, Campbell traces the evolution 
of codes of professional conduct.  See id.  The first professional code of conduct in 1908 was 
ethos based, and generally an attempt to codify morality and behavior.  Id. at 128.  It was 
aspirational.  Id. at 133.  The 1960s saw a shift to a more practical approach with an emphasis 
on resolving ethical issues that arose in practice in addition to creating an enforcement mech-
anism.  See id. at 134–35.  The code was set out in three parts.  Campbell, supra note 8, at 
135.  The Canons offered “axiomatic norms.”  Id.  Ethical considerations were identified but 
again, adherence was aspirational.  Id.  Finally, disciplinary rules were incorporated that set a 
floor for proper conduct.  Id.  The final significant shift occurred in 1983 when the rules 
evolved into black letter law with rules and comments to guide behavior and to impose disci-
pline as necessary.  Id. at 136. 
 22. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT scope paras. 14–16 (explaining the proper 
interpretation of the rules, including the words “shall,” “shall not,” “may,” and “should” when 
used in conjunction with the rules or the comments; setting the rules in a larger context of law 
and licensure; and clarifying the rules are not exhaustive of a lawyer’s moral and ethical obli-
gations); see also Campbell, supra note 8, at 128–37. 
 23. Keith W. Rizzardi, Defining Professionalism: I Know It When I See It?, FLA. B.J., 
July-Aug. 2005, at 38, 38.  See Deasonlaw, Ethics and Professionalism, TAMPA BAY BUS. L. 
(Mar. 16, 2012), http://tampabaybusinesslaw.wordpress.com/2012/03/16/ethics-and-
professionalism/. 
No code or set of rules can be framed which will particularize all the duties of the lawyer. . . . 
The . . . canons of ethics are . . . a general guide, yet the enumeration of particular duties 
should not be construed as a denial of the existence of others equally imperative, though not 
specifically mentioned. 
CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS pmbl. (1908); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 
para. 7. 
Many of a lawyer’s professional responsibilities are prescribed in the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, as well as substantive and procedural law.  However, a lawyer is also guided by per-
sonal conscience . . . . A lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the 
law and the legal profession and to exemplify the legal profession’s ideals of public service. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 7. 
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duties to client, court, and community.24  The rules, however, cannot dictate 
all of an attorney’s conduct or address every situation.25  Thus, they represent 
a starting point, not an end goal.26  This means, however, that there is a gap 
between what is required and what is expected.27  The problem occurs when 
that gap exposes a lawyer to divergent choices that serve competing interests 
—advocacy and protection of a client versus serving the goals of justice or 
professional conduct. 
To truly satisfy her ethical obligation, a lawyer must do more than the 
minimum.28  Indeed, professionalism as a concept arose out of an acknowl-
edgement that the rules were not enough.29  Somewhere between the floor 
and the ceiling, there must be a happy medium where competing obligations 
of practice and professionalism can be woven together to build a stronger, 
more complete foundation for the practice of law that provides clearer expec-
tations for those who practice. 
There has been a modern movement within the legal community to cap-
ture the ideals of professionalism and civility and articulate them as aspira-
tions and goals for the practicing bar.30  The American Bar Association 
  
 24. See id.  “Each lawyer must find within his own conscience the touchstone against 
which to test the extent to which his actions should rise above minimum standards.”  MODEL 
CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1983). 
 25. See 4 FLA. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 97 (2008).  “The standards of professional 
conduct to be observed by members of the Florida Bar are not limited to the observance of 
rules and avoidance of prohibited acts, and . . . the failure to specify any particular act of mis-
conduct [will not] be construed as tolerance thereof.”  Id. 
 26. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 7. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. scope para. 16. 
 29. See Deasonlaw, supra note 23. 
Professionalism differs from ethics in the sense that ethics is a minimum standard . . . while 
professionalism is a higher standard expected of all lawyers.  Professionalism imposes no offi-
cial sanctions.  It offers no official reward.  Yet, sanctions and rewards exist unofficially.  Who 
faces a greater sanction than lost respect?  Who faces a greater reward than the satisfaction of 
doing right for right's own sake? 
Id. (quoting John W. Spears, Interview with Harold G. Clark, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of 
Georgia, DECATUR-DEKALB B. Q., May 24, 1990). 
 30. See Kez U. Gabriel, The Idealist Discourse of Legal Professionalism in Maryland:  
Delineating the Omissions and Eloquent Silences as a Progressive Critique, 41 U. BALT. L.F. 
120, 123–24 (2011) (reviewing the newly-adopted Ideals of Professionalism in Maryland).  
This movement is by no means new.  See Hoeflich & Badgerow, supra note 15, at 414–15.  
As multiple scholars have pointed out, almost any generation of lawyers has a previous gener-
ation that bemoans their inability to conduct themselves professionally and civilly.  See id. at 
413; Campbell, supra note 8, at 103.  Neil Hamilton notes that “[t]he critical question at any 
point in the legal profession’s history is not whether the profession had more civility or a 
deeper sense of calling at an earlier period” but rather, it is “whether the profession and each 
individual lawyer can do better than they are doing today in realizing the profession’s public 
purpose, core values, and ideals.”  Neil Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, 18 PROF. 
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(“ABA”), the federal government, and several states have implemented aspi-
rational goals related to professionalism, civility, or behavior in the practice 
of law over the last twenty or so years.31  The problem, however, is that these 
aspirational goals lack any real effectiveness because, unlike laws or manda-
tory rules of professional conduct, there is no consequence for failure to 
comply above and beyond community reaction.32  So, while these goals help 
articulate clearer guidance for attorneys of what is expected, they do little to 
alleviate the tension between zealous advocacy and professionalism.33  How-
ever, the Florida Bar has proposed rules for enforcing professionalism based 
on its preexisting professionalism goals.34  Recent law review articles dis-
  
LAW, no. 4, 2008, at 4, 4.  But this movement has changed from simple complaint to action 
with the advent of codes of professionalism, creeds of professionalism, both aspirational and 
now regulatory, that seek to shape how lawyers behave while practicing law.  See, e.g., Pro-
posed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, FLA. B. NEWS, May 15, 2012, 
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNNews01.nsf/Articles/4496E3E1F2882611852579F
4006DF11E. 
 31. See Professionalism Codes, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/professionalism/pro
fessionalism_codes.html (last updated Aug. 2012) [hereinafter Professionalism Codes].  Ac-
cording to the ABA’s website, to date, forty-two states and the District of Columbia have 
professionalism codes, civility codes, or some other standard of conduct set apart from the 
rules of professional conduct that have been promulgated by either that state’s bar, Supreme 
Court, or commission on professionalism.  See id.  Several smaller bars within many states 
also have their own codes.  See id.  But these codes, whether state or local, are aspirational 
and some, like Louisiana and Virginia’s, specifically provide that failure to comply will not be 
used as a basis for sanctions or discipline.  LA. SUP. CT. GEN. ADMIN. R. pt. G, § 11, pmbl.; 
Professional Guidelines, VA. ST. B., http://www.vsb.org/pro-guidelines/index.php/principles 
(last updated Dec. 22, 2009) (“Having been unanimously endorsed by Virginia’s statewide bar 
organizations, the Principles [articulate] standards of civility to which all Virginia lawyers 
should aspire.  The Principles of Professionalism shall not serve as a basis for disciplinary 
action or for civil liability.”).  The ABA, as well as many of its sections, has also adopted 
aspirational professionalism standards.  E.g., SECTION OF FAMILY LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
CIVILITY STANDARDS (2006), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/family/reports/standards_civility.authc
heckdam.pdf.  Other national organizations, including the American Board of Trial Advocates 
and the American College of Trial Lawyers, have adopted professionalism codes.  AM. BD. OF 
TRIAL ADVOCATES, PRINCIPLES OF CIVILITY, INTEGRITY, AND PROFESSIONALISM pmbl. (n.d.), 
available at https://www.abota.org/index.cfm?pg=Civility (follow “download” hyperlink); 
AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, CODE OF PRETRIAL AND TRIAL CONDUCT 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=All_publications&Template=/CM/contentDi
splay.cfm&contentID=4380. 
 32. See LA. SUP. CT. GEN. ADMIN. R. pt. G, § 11, pmbl.; Professional Guidelines, supra 
note 31. 
 33. Hoeflich & Badgerow, supra note 15, at 416; see LA. SUP. CT. GEN. ADMIN. R. pt. G, 
§ 11, pmbl.; Professional Guidelines, supra note 31. 
 34. Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30. 
118 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  
cussing the twin necessities of professionalism and civility offer studies, 
suggestions, and salvos against the fall of standards within the legal profes-
sion.35  Like Florida, other state bars may consider taking aspirational goals 
for attorney conduct and turning them into actionable rules.36 
This is a “new professionalism” borne of a constant refrain that the 
newest generation of lawyers fails to uphold the standards of those who came 
before;37 the difference now is that this new professionalism will have teeth, 
and more closely resemble a marriage between mandatory legal ethical 
standards and what have been, for the most part, aspirational goals for pro-
fessionalism.38 
But this shift to a more professional practice must be examined against 
the historical backdrop of advocacy,39 the role of a lawyer in litigation,40 and 
the attorney client relationship.41  It remains a tension between advocacy and 
ethics,42 client and court,43 and attorney and community.44  In some ways, it 
  
 35. See Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, Professionalism’s Triple E Query:  Is Legal Academia 
Enhancing, Eluding, or Evading Professionalism?, 55 LOY. L. REV. 517, 556–57 (2009) [here-
inafter Boothe-Perry, Professionalism’s Triple E Query] (asserting the importance of academ-
ia’s roll in molding professionalism in the legal community); Gabriel, supra note 30, at 121–
27, 146–47 (reviewing the newly adopted “Ideals of Professionalism” in Maryland and dis-
cussing the gaps within those ideals); Hoeflich & Badgerow, supra note 15, at 413 n.1, 415; 
Dennis A. Rendleman, Pogo Professionalism:  A Call for a Commission on Truth and Profes-
sionalism, 2012 J. PROF. LAW. 181, 185, 199–200; Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, Professionalism 
and Academia, PROFESSIONAL, Summer 2010, at 6, 6–7, [hereinafter Boothe-Perry, Profes-
sionalism and Academia] (discussing professionalism and learned behavior in the law school 
setting).  Hoeflich and Badgerow cite a two-fold crisis:  “[T]he general public neither under-
stands nor appreciates the skill, dedication, and public service exhibited by the vast majority 
of Kansas lawyers” and “it seems that civility, decency, and cooperation among Kansas law-
yers is on the decline, based on personal experience, case reports, and anecdotal evidence.”  
Hoeflich & Badgerow, supra note 15, at 414; see also Hamilton, supra note 30, at 4. 
 36. See Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30.  How-
ever, not everyone believes enforceable professionalism codes are necessary, positing that the 
current rules of professional conduct, the inherent powers of the court, and more education 
can be used effectively to cure what ails our profession.  See Hoeflich & Badgerow, supra 
note 15, at 414–15 (advocating for using existing means to control objectionable behavior, 
“mandatory ‘professionalism’ education for law students, . . . and . . . annual continuing edu-
cation for lawyers”); see also Gabriel, supra note 30, at 123, 136. 
 37. See Hoeflich & Badgerow, supra note 15, at 414. 
 38. See Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30. 
 39. See Campbell, supra note 8, at 134. 
 40. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 cmt. c (1977). 
 41. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 2. 
 42. Compare Anenson, supra note 12, at 922–23 (advocacy), with RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 cmt. a (ethics). 
 43. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 9 (client), and id. R. 1.2 
(client), with id. R. 3.3 (court). 
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seems that this move toward professionalism could be setting attorneys up 
for failure no matter what the context. 
Regulating a certain level of behavior is problematic at best.  Normally, 
this would be something left to an attorney’s community to regulate,45 but the 
constant refrain that professionalism is lacking seems to indicate otherwise.46  
Lawyers are nothing more than their reputation.47  So, when a lawyer be-
haves badly, is rude, or is otherwise inappropriate on a professional level, the 
community reacts accordingly.48 
Judges and colleagues react differently depending on a person’s behav-
ior.49 
“A lawyer who seriously offends against widely held professional 
norms faces unofficial but nonetheless powerful interdictions.  
Those include sanctions such as negative publicity and other ex-
pressions of peer disapproval, the cutting off of valuable practice 
opportunities . . . denial of access to centers of power and prestige . 
. . and [the] preclusion from judicial posts.”50 
The community, however, can also respect the difference between a 
good lawyer that may be difficult to deal with at times, and a nice lawyer that 
may not have the same skills.  The problem with trying to require the prickly 
lawyer to hew to a “nicer” practice of law is that it may serve no purpose in 
the larger scheme of things, and may in fact harm the underlying principles 
of practice that have been indelibly inked on our profession. 
In some instances, the tension between the common law and rules of 
professional conduct may also force an attorney to make difficult ethical or 
strategic choices in the name of advocacy.51  The shift to mandatory profes-
  
 44. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 9 (attorney), with id. pmbl. 
para. 6 (community). 
 45. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 10. 
 46. Hoeflich & Badgerow, supra note 15, at 414–15. 
 47. See Professional Guidelines, supra note 31. 
 48. See Campbell, supra note 8, at 101. 
 49. Hamilton, supra note 30, at 12. 
 50. Id. (first and second alterations in original) (quoting CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, 
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 22 (student ed., 1986)). 
 51. See Campbell, supra note 8, at 137; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.6 cmt. 12.  For example, a lawyer must keep evidence of a past crime confidential if it is 
disclosed by his client.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 8.  It is the quintessen-
tial dilemma, not being able to tell someone where the body is buried.  See id.  The same can 
be said of permitting a criminal defendant to testify on his own behalf, thereby exercising his 
constitutional rights when the attorney suspects, but does not know for sure, that the defendant 
will lie on the witness stand.  See id. R. 3.3 cmt. 8.  Comment 9 “prohibits a lawyer from 
offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false, [but] permits the lawyer to refuse to offer 
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sionalism creates an additional tension between a lawyer’s need to represent 
a client professionally and to legitimately take advantage of those tools 
available to do so, even where they do not entirely embrace the ideals of pro-
fessionalism.52  The backlash that a zealous lawyer may receive in the name 
of regulating civility and codifying professionalism will not sting any less 
simply because the lawyer may not face civil liability for her actions.53  As 
proposed in Florida, there is still an intake, review, and grievance process for 
professionalism complaints, just as there is for any other bar grievance.54 
The concern is how to reconcile a lawyer’s obligations:  To create a 
meaningful relationship between a lawyer’s role as a practitioner, a lawyer’s 
role as a colleague, and a lawyer’s role as a member of the larger legal com-
munity.  This must be done in the larger context of both ethics and mandato-
ry professionalism.  These concerns come into sharper focus when consider-
ing the lawyer’s litigation privilege, also known as absolute immunity.55  
According to several courts, even though an attorney is not subject to civil 
liability for defamation or other related torts that bear some relation to a legal 
proceeding, an attorney is still subject to court sanctions or to disciplinary 
action for defamatory conduct.56  The problem is that it appears to be rare 
  
testimony or other proof that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.”  Id. cmt. 9 (emphasis 
added).  However, the “Rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the testimony of [a 
criminal defendant] where the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know that the testimo-
ny [is] false.”  Id. 
 52. See Campbell, supra note 8, at 139; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 
(1977).  For example, attacking a witness’s credibility, or being permitted to make defamatory 
statements in a judicial proceeding.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 cmt. c. 
 53. See, e.g., O’Neil v. Cunningham, 173 Cal. Rptr. 422, 428 (Ct. App. 1981). 
 54. Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30. 
 55. See Anenson, supra note 12, at 916. 
An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in 
communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or dur-
ing the course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it 
has some relation to the proceeding. 
Id. at 918 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586).  “The privilege applies 
regardless of malice, bad faith, or any nefarious motives on the part of the lawyer so long 
as the conduct complained of has some relation to the litigation.”  Id. 
 56. Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So. 2d 380, 384 (Fla. 
2007) (noting “the trial court’s contempt power [and] the disciplinary measures of the state 
court system and bar association” address this type of misconduct); Levin, Middlebrooks, 
Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608–09 (Fla. 
1994); O’Neil, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 428 (acknowledging that while the attorney could not be 
subject to civil liability for a breach of trust, it “may subject him to disciplinary action”); 
Higgs v. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d 840, 865 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (Erickson, J., dissenting) 
(agreeing with the majority that alternate remedies are available in absolute immunity cases); 
Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. 1995) (citing Rubertson v. Gabage, 654 A.2d 
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that those sanctions are imposed, particularly with respect to disciplinary 
action.57  As professionalism becomes a subject of discipline, these newly 
enforceable “aspirations” could alter the balance struck between a person’s 
right to be free from harmful statements and acts such as defamation, and an 
attorney’s need to have wide latitude to protect his client and proceed with 
his case.58  The extent of this problem cannot be understated.  Only two 
states do not recognize absolute immunity.59  Even the two states that do not 
recognize absolute immunity have simply adopted a qualified version of the 
same immunity.60  It is not that these contradictory concepts cannot coexist, 
but the crux of the problem is deciding how to strike a balance that properly 
acknowledges the value of each. 
Part II of this article will discuss “professionalism” as a concept, and 
discuss how it has been defined by scholars and various bar associations.  
Part III will examine how there has been a shift from aspirational profession-
alism goals, to a move to enforceable standards of professionalism based on 
these goals in Florida.  As an example of the tension that may be created by 
  
1002, 1006–07 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); Kirschstein v. Haynes, 788 P.2d 941, 950–51 
(Okla. 1990)). 
 57. See Debra Moss Curtis, Attorney Discipline Nationwide:  A Comparative Analysis of 
Process and Statistics, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 209, 235 (2011).  The Seventh Circuit has even 
acknowledged that while disciplinary action and court sanctions have always been available 
remedies to redress an attorney’s improper conduct during litigation, “the likelihood of these 
sanctions being invoked is speculative at best.”  Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 
278–79 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing the balance between a person’s rights and the attorney’s 
need to be unfettered).  It is curious why cases, where defamation or a related claim is made, 
do not make their way to disciplinary proceedings.  Perhaps it is a two-fold problem.  First, a 
defamation plaintiff seeks to be made whole—either by receiving some sort of retraction, 
apology, or money—and disciplinary proceedings may not accomplish that.  Oral Argument at 
26:30, DelMonico v. Traynor, No. SC10-1397, (Fla. June 9, 2011), available at 
http://wfsu.org/gavel2gavel/archives/flash/viewcase.php?case=10-1397.  Second, disciplinary 
proceedings, and discipline itself, generally cannot be used as “a basis for civil liability.”  
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT scope para. 20 (2012).  So maybe there is some unwritten 
corollary that it is unfair to discipline an attorney for strategic choices that are otherwise per-
missible and not subject to civil liability. 
 58. Anenson, supra note 12, at 920–21, 925–26; see also Campbell, supra note 8, at 100. 
 59. Anenson, supra note 12, at 917. 
 60. Id. at 917 n.6.  Louisiana recognizes immunity, but qualifies it such that it is only 
available when “the statement [is] material, . . . made with probable cause, and without mal-
ice.”  Freeman v. Cooper, 414 So. 2d 355, 359 (La. 1982) (citing Waldo v. Morrison, 58 So. 
2d 210, 211 (La. 1952)); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:49 (2012), declared unconstitu-
tional by Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); id. § 14:50.  The Supreme Court of Loui-
siana, in rejecting the absolute nature of the immunity, observed that the immunity is “not a 
license to impugn the professional integrity of opposing counsel or the reputation of a litigant 
or witness;” it is designed to protect those “who are merely performing their duties.”  Free-
man, 414 So. 2d at 359. 
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these new rules, absolute immunity is reviewed and discussed in Part IV.  In 
Part V, the author highlights how absolute immunity has been applied in a 
recent defamation case on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida.  
Against this backdrop, the author then considers the contradictions inherent 
in protecting lawyers from what would otherwise be considered unprofes-
sional conduct in the name of zealous representation of the client.  Finally, 
Part VI considers how legal theories such as absolute immunity should be 
viewed within the context of a potential movement toward enforcing manda-
tory professionalism standards in the practice of law. 
II. PROFESSIONALISM, A CONCEPT DEFINED 
“‘[P]rofessionalism’ seems to encompass practically all concerns 
about what lawyers do and the way in which they do it.”61 
A. Scholars Approach to Professionalism 
There are as many definitions of “professionalism” as there are people 
who seek to define it.62  It has been defined by author and organization 
alike.63  Quite often, it is distinguished as a step above the professional rules, 
an ideal to aspire to and behavior that should be expected.64  However, some 
definitions have chosen to frame it as a minimum standard as well, just as the 
rules of professional conduct are framed.65  In that instance, professionalism 
is conceived as “the minimum level of civility in word and action that law-
  
 61. Donald Hubert, Competence, Ethics, and Civility as the Core of Professionalism:  
The Role of Bar Associations and the Special Problems of Small Firms and Solo Practitioners, 
in TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM 113, 115 (1996) (emphasis added). 
 62. See Hamilton, supra note 30, at 5.  Neil Hamilton sought to classify these definitions, 
noting that there are three varieties of scholarship on professionalism.  Id.  The first makes “no 
attempt to affirmatively state [the] definition of the concept itself,” but rather presumes the 
definition is “self-evident or meant to be implicitly understood within the context of the arti-
cle’s main focus.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  The second “focus[es] on one or more characteris-
tics that are the ‘core’ of professionalism,” more specifically enumerating the requisite values, 
standards, and “commitment[s] to public service.”  Id.  Finally, a third “dismisses [it] as a 
misguided concept.”  Id. 
 63. See Hamilton, supra note 30, at 5; Burnele V. Powell, Essay, Lawyer Professionalism 
as Ordinary Morality, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 275, 277–80 (1994); Timothy P. Terrell & James H. 
Wildman, Rethinking “Professionalism”, 41 EMORY L.J. 403, 424 (1992) (listing six values 
that comprise the elements of a professional tradition); Ideals and Goals of Professionalism, 
FLA. B., 
http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/TFBProfess.nsf/5d2a29f983dc81ef85256709006a486a/deafda73
c03233e985256b2f006ccd5e?OpenDocument (last updated May 26, 2011). 
 64. See Hoeflich & Badgerow, supra note 15, at 415–16. 
 65. Id. at 415. 
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yers believe every lawyer should show every other lawyer, the minimum 
level of cooperation expected among lawyers in adversarial and non-
adversarial situations, and the minimum degree of courtesy one would expect 
lawyers to show each other.”66  Still, another posits that while “ethical obli-
gations can be seen as the shall-nots of lawyering, . . . professionalism 
[should be seen] as creating affirmative obligations of the lawyer to the 
broader society.”67 
Another author has distilled professionalism down to five principles—
focusing on personal conscience, ethics of duty, ethics of aspiration, holding 
colleagues to the same standards, and reflective engagement, including con-
templating income and wealth balanced by public obligation.68  Interestingly, 
at least one scholar has attempted to identify the core concepts of civility as 
distinct obligations separate from legal ethics and professionalism.69  Camp-
bell identifies ten common concepts including “maintain[ing] honesty and 
personal integrity . . . avoid[ing] actions taken merely to delay or harass . . . 
act[ing] with dignity and cooperation in pre-trial proceedings, [and] act[ing] 
as a role model to the client and public.”70 
B. Organizational Definitions of Professionalism 
The Kansas Bar has conceived professionalism as a focus on actions 
that are grounded in “civility, respect, fairness, learning, and integrity” that 
encompass the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court “and as a public citizen 
with special responsibilities for the quality of justice.”71  The Florida Bar has 
defined professionalism, in its broadest terms, as a commitment to “ensure[] 
that concern for the desired result does not subvert fairness, honesty, respect 
and courtesy for others with whom one comes into contact . . . [including] 
opponents.”72  The ABA has defined a “professional lawyer” in the context 
of professionalism as “an expert in law pursuing a learned art in service to 
  
 66. Id. 
 67. Campbell, supra note 8, at 139.  Campbell carries this notion of a larger societal 
obligation further positing that “morality represents a personal conscience, whereas profes-
sionalism represents a social conscience.”  Id. at 141. 
 68. Hamilton, supra note 30, at 8. 
 69. Campbell, supra note 8, at 99, 128, 142. 
 70. Id. at 109. 
 71. Hoeflich & Badgerow, supra note 15, at 416. 
 72. Ideals and Goals of Professionalism, supra note 63.  Maryland defines it as “the 
combination of the core values of personal integrity, competency, civility, independence, and 
public service that distinguish lawyers as the caretakers of the rule of law.”  MD. R. app. Ideals 
of Professionalism. 
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clients and in the spirit of public service; and engaging in these pursuits as 
part of a common calling to promote justice and public good.”73 
C. A Working Definition 
No matter what definition is used, professionalism is universally con-
sidered to be something separate from the rules themselves, even if it is also 
complementary to them.74  Perhaps professionalism is best captured as that 
intangible space between “shall” and “may,” and an understanding that so-
ciety demands more than that which is required by “must.”  Where a lawyer 
ends up on the spectrum between what you must do, what you can do, and 
what you should do, is going to be impacted by the definition of profession-
alism that is adopted in his community and potentially codified into enforce-
able standards.  As legal communities continue to articulate and refine the 
new professionalism, norms will shift to raise the bar for desired behavior. 
III. PROFESSIONALISM, A CONCEPT ENFORCED 
“‘To opposing parties and their counsel, I pledge fairness, integrity, 
and civility, not only in court, but also in all written and oral communica-
tions.’”75 
A. Florida 
The Oath of the Florida Bar was changed in 2011 to add the language 
quoted above.76  The move was designed to emphasize a shift in conscious-
  
 73. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, TEACHING AND 
LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM:  REPORT OF THE PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE 6 (1996) (empha-
sis omitted).  The ABA notes the following “[e]ssential characteristics of [a] professional 
lawyer . . . :  1) [l]earned knowledge; 2) [s]kill in applying the applicable law to the factual 
context; 3) [t]horoughness of preparation; 4) [p]ractical and prudential wisdom; 5) [e]thical 
conduct and integrity; [and] 6) [d]edication to justice and the public good.”  Id. at 6–7.  This 
Report is based on two earlier reports commissioned by the ABA:  The 1986 Stanley Com-
mission Report and the 1992 MacCrate Commission Report.  Id. at 1. 
 74. See, e.g., AM. BD. OF TRIAL ADVOCATES, supra note 31, at pmbl. 
 75. Oath of Admission to The Florida Bar, FLA. B., http://www.floridabar.org/tfb 
/TFBProfess.nsf/basic+view/04E9EB581538255A85256B2F006CCD7D?OpenDocument 
(last updated Sept. 13, 2011) (emphasis added). 
 76. In re Oath of Admission to The Florida Bar, 73 So. 3d 149, 150 (Fla. 2011) (per 
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ness from baseline legal ethics to a higher standard of conduct, particularly 
with respect to civility.77  At the same time, the Florida Board of Bar Exam-
iners announced that professionalism would be tested as a separate subject on 
the Florida Bar beginning in 2013.78  Finally, recommendations were made to 
begin addressing professionalism complaints much in the same way ethics 
complaints are currently processed by the Florida Bar.79  At the most recent 
Florida Bar Convention, former Florida Bar President Scott Hawkins told an 
audience assembled to discuss the matter of enforcing professionalism stand-
ards in Florida that “‘this topic is ground zero for our . . . efforts of the next 
10 years. . . . [I]t will not go away.’”80  Indeed, the Supreme Court of Flori-
da’s Commission on Professionalism tentatively adopted guidelines for dis-
ciplining substantial and repeated violations of the professionalism standards 
in Florida.81  These proposed guidelines are based on the professionalism 
standards set forth in Florida’s Creed of Professionalism, Ideals and Goals of 
Professionalism, and the Oath of Attorney.82 
  
f0058f33ea1ffefc8525791700476e37!OpenDocument; see also Oath of Admission to The 
Florida Bar, supra note 75. 
 77. Pudlow, supra note 76. 
 78. In re Amendments to Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to Admissions to the Bar, 
51 So. 3d 1144, 1145 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam), reh’g granted, 54 So. 3d 460 (Fla. 2011).  The 
Bar has defined the subject matter for testing “professionalism” as that information mainly 
contained in three documents:  Florida’s Creed of Professionalism, Guidelines for Profession-
al Conduct developed by the Trial Lawyers Section of the Florida Bar, and the Ideals and 
Goals of Professionalism.  Kirsten Davis, Assessing Aspiration:  Florida Bar Exam to Test 
Professionalism Guidelines (AALS Professional Responsibility Section Newsletter, D.C.), 
Spring 2011, at 28, 28–29.  Davis noted that this is “a compliance first-step—requiring . . . 
that lawyers know the professionalism guidelines.”  Id. at 31.  Another byproduct of such 
action, is a “de facto ‘codif[ication]’ [of] uniform, customary expectations of professional 
practice in Florida.”  Id.  Finally, such action has elevated professionalism to the level of other 
subject matter and “branded” it with “intellectual and practical legitimacy.”  Id. at 32. 
 79. Gary Blankenship, Lapses in Professionalism May Lead to Disciplinary Sanctions, 
FLA. B. NEWS, July 15, 2012, 
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNNews01.nsf/RSSFeed/F3B6FE3E910088D685257
A3600436181 [hereinafter Blankenship, Disciplinary Sanctions]; see Gary Blankenship, Put-
ting ‘Teeth’ in Professionalism:  Comments Sought on Proposed Professionalism Rules, FLA. 
B. NEWS, May 15, 2012, 
http://www.floridabar.org/divcom/jn/jnnews01.nsf/8c9f13012b96736985256aa900624829/92c
1e519c6934a8e852579f4006c11cb!OpenDocument [hereinafter Blankenship, Putting ‘Teeth’ 
in Professionalism]. 
 80. Blankenship, Disciplinary Sanctions, supra note 79 (first alteration in original). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id.; Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30. 
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1. Development of New Professionalism Standards 
a. Ideals and Goals 
In 1990, the Board of Governors of the Florida Bar adopted the Ideals 
and Goals of Professionalism.83  There are seven ideals and each one con-
tains corresponding goals.84  Professionalism is broadly defined, and it in-
cludes a commitment to “ensur[e] that concern for the desired result does not 
subvert fairness, honesty, respect, and courtesy for others with whom one 
comes into contact . . . [including] opponents.”85  Ideal two provides that “[a] 
lawyer should at all times be guided by a fundamental sense of honor, integ-
rity, and fair play, and should counsel his or her client to do likewise.”86  In 
furtherance of this ideal, a stated goal is that “[a] lawyer should abstain from 
conduct calculated to detract or divert the fact-finder’s attention from the 
relevant facts or otherwise cause it to reach a decision on an impermissible 
basis.”87 
b. Florida’s Creed of Professionalism 
The Creed of Professionalism followed the Ideals and Goals of Profes-
sionalism and was adopted in 1989.88  Developed by the Florida Bar, the 
Creed of Professionalism sought to memorialize the professional obligations 
that underlie an attorney’s obligations to his client, the judiciary, and the 
administration of justice.89  It provides in part that an attorney 
will strictly adhere to the spirit as well as the letter of [the] profes-
sion’s code of ethics, . . . be guided by a fundamental sense of 
honor, integrity, and fair play, . . . [and] not knowingly misstate, 
  
 83. Ideals and Goals of Professionalism, supra note 63. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Professionalism Codes, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibiliity/committees_commissions/sta
ndingcommitteeonprofessionalism2/professionalismhomepage/profesionalsimcodes.html (last 
visited .Oct. 28, 2012) [hereinafter Professionalism Codes and Year]. 
 89. See Creed of Professionalism, FLA. B., 
http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/82D119A3382C40F185256F
FD0072FC8C/$FILE/CreedOfProfessionalism.pdf?OpenElement (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
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distort, or improperly exaggerate any fact or opinion and will not 
improperly permit my silence or inaction to mislead anyone.90 
c. Guidelines for Professional Conduct 
The Guidelines for Professional Conduct, first promulgated in 1994 and 
most recently revised in 2008,91 are more detailed and address administrative 
issues such as:  Scheduling, continuances, and extensions of time; service of 
papers; written submissions to the court; as well as litigation matters includ-
ing discovery, motions practice, and trial conduct.92 
2. Imposing Discipline for Issues Related to Professionalism Under the 
Rules of Professional Conduct 
Florida’s move to regulate professionalism does not mean that an attor-
ney could not previously be subjected to discipline for unprofessional con-
duct.93  Prior to the Florida Bar’s move to develop enforceable professional-
ism standards, attorneys were simply more likely to be disciplined under 
catch-all provisions of Rule 4-8.4(d), Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 
which makes it a violation to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the ad-
ministration of justice.94  Because it is so broadly written, this rule has been 
applied to a variety of circumstances and has been used to address egregious 
breaches of professionalism that in and of themselves flirt with the “musts” 
of the rules of professional conduct.95 
  
 90. Id. 
 91. Guidelines for Professional Conduct, FLA. B., http://www.floridabar.org/tfb 
/TFBProfess.nsf/5d2a29f983dc81ef85256709006a486a/2f2668cdfd7b99e085256b2f006ccd15 
(last updated Sept. 8, 2011). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id.; R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-8.4(d) (2012). 
 94. See Fla. Bar re:  Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 621 So. 2d 1032, 
1049 (Fla. 1993) (per curiam); R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-8.4(d).  Rule 4-8.4(d) provides 
that: 
 A lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through callous indiffer-
ence, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, 
or other lawyers on any basis, including, but not limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gen-
der, religion, national origin, disability, marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic 
status, employment, or physical characteristic. 
Id. 
 95. See Fla. Bar v. Knowles, 37 Fla. L. Weekly S508, S509 (July 12, 2012) (per curiam); 
Fla. Bar v. Mitchell, No. SC10-637, slip op. at 1 (Fla. Oct. 5, 2010); Referee Report at 1–2, 
Fla. Bar v. Mitchell, 46 So. 3d 1003 (Fla. 2010) (No. SC10-637) [hereinafter Mitchell Re-
port]; Complaint at 1, 3, Fla. Bar v. Mitchell, 46 So. 3d 1003 (Fla. 2010) (No. SC10-637) 
[hereinafter Mitchell Complaint]; see also R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-8.4(d). 
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a. Lawyers Behaving (Very) Badly 
In one instance, two attorneys, Kurt Mitchell and Nicholas Mooney, 
who could not even maintain a professional relationship with each other for 
more than the length of an e-mail, were disciplined for violating Rule 4-
8.4(d).96  The e-mail exchanges between counsel were exceedingly unpleas-
ant and on more than one occasion would escalate to outright name calling 
and other childish behavior.97  And although both attorneys were equally 
guilty of inappropriate, completely unprofessional remarks, Mooney finally 
reported Mitchell to the Florida Bar when Mitchell made disparaging re-
marks about his disabled child including the statement, “[w]hile I am sorry to 
hear about your disabled child; that sort of thing is to be expected when a 
retard reproduces . . . I would look at the bright side at least you definitely 
know the kid is yours.”98  Mitchell received a ten-day suspension and was 
required to attend the Florida Bar’s Anger Management Workshop.99  
Mooney received a public reprimand for his behavior and was required to 
attend a professionalism program.100 
More recently, an attorney was suspended for a year for, among other 
things, disparaging her client after she was fired.101  The attorney filed a Mo-
  
 96. Mitchell, No. SC10-637, slip op. at 1; Mitchell Report, supra  note 95, at 1, 2; Mitch-
ell Complaint, supra  note 95, at 1, 3; Fla. Bar v. Mooney, No. SC10-640, 2010 WL 4685407, 
at *1 (Fla. Nov. 16, 2010); Referee Report at 1, 2, Fla. Bar v. Mooney, 49 So. 3d 748 (Fla. 
2010) (No. SC10-640) [hereinafter Mooney Report]; Complaint at 1, 3, Fla. Bar v. Mooney, 
49 So. 3d 748 (Fla. 2010) (No. SC10-640) [hereinafter Mooney Complaint].  The complaints 
against Kurt D. Mitchell and Nicholas Mooney also cited them for violating Rule 3-4.3, 
“commission of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice.”  Mitchell Com-
plaint, supra note 95, at 3; Mooney Complaint, supra note 96, at 3; see also R. REGULATING 
FLA. BAR 3-4.3. 
 97. See Mitchell Complaint, supra note 95, Ex. A, at 1.  For example, Mooney continual-
ly referred to Mitchell as “Junior” and Mitchell to Mooney as “Old Hack.”  Id.  In addition, at 
one point Mooney stated that “the fact that you are married means that there truly is someone 
for everyone, even a short/hairless jerk!!!  Moreover, the fact that you have pro-created is 
further proof for the need of forced sterilization!!!”  Id. Ex. B, at 1. 
 98. Id. Ex. C, at 1. 
 99. Mitchell, No. SC10-637, slip op. at 1.  However, it is interesting to note that Mitchell 
had two other pending disciplinary cases that served as an additional underlying basis for his 
discipline—one for failure to pay a deposition transcription bill and one for sending disparag-
ing and humiliating emails to his landlord when the two became embroiled in a conflict.  
Mitchell Report, supra note 95, at 2. 
 100. Mooney, 2010 WL 4685407, at *1; see Mooney Report, supra note 96, at 2. 
 101. Fla. Bar v. Knowles, 37 Fla. L. Weekly S508, S508–10 (July 12, 2012) (per curiam). 
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tion to Withdraw four days before an immigration hearing on the ground that 
the client had paid her with a check that bounced.102 
In her motion, the attorney also stated “that she regretted helping her 
client, who [was] right[fully] convicted [of] grand theft, and that [she] had 
received reports from the [client’s] community that [the] client had robbed 
them.”103  The motion was withdrawn when the attorney and client resolved 
the matter.104  Another motion was filed to withdraw after the client retained 
new counsel, and at the same time, the attorney advised an assistant state 
attorney that “she had reason to believe her client would lie to the Immigra-
tion Court at an upcoming hearing.”105 
The referee found the attorney violated Rule 4-8.4(d) of the Rules 
Regulating the Florida Bar, for “conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.”106  The Supreme Court of Florida commented separately on this 
violation, addressing its egregious nature: 
Respondent filed two motions on separate occasions in which she 
disparaged her client’s character in a reprehensible fashion.  Re-
spondent attacked her client’s integrity with regard to her alleged 
failure to honor checks and fulfill contracts.  Respondent further 
stated that she had heard reports that her client had robbed mem-
bers of the Romanian community.  Finally, and most egregiously, 
Respondent brazenly asserted that her client had been rightfully 
convicted for grand theft, and that Respondent actually regretted 
having helped her client.  Such disparaging language is needless 
and has no place in a public court pleading, especially when the 
statements are made by an attorney and are directed at the attor-
ney’s own client.  Unbridled language of this sort harms the client 
and causes the public to lose faith in the legal profession.  Re-
  
 102. Id. at S508.  In fact, counsel implied in her motion that the funds were for an immi-
gration matter when in fact they were for another case in which she was representing the same 
client.  Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Knowles, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at S508. 
 106. Id. at S509; see also R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-8.4(d) (2012).  The referee observed 
that: 
“regardless of intent, the very act of filing such a motion with such language is so prejudicial 
to the client so as to be actionable.”  The referee stated that it was inconceivable that anyone 
knowing the rules of ethics would think such statements would be appropriate.  Accordingly, 
the referee recommended that Respondent be found guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(d). 
Knowles, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at S509 (quoting Referee Report at 7, Fla Bar. v. Knowles, 37 
Fla. L. Weekly S508 (July 12, 2012) (No. SC10-1019)). 
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spondent’s conduct was highly prejudicial to the administration of 
justice and cannot be tolerated.107 
b. Making the Crime Fit the Punishment 
The attorneys’ unprofessional conduct in each of these cases was found 
to violate Rule 4-8.4(d) and these attorneys were subject to discipline as a 
result.108  Discipline was appropriate in both circumstances and certainly 
keeps with the purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct.109  However, 
similar conduct could now be regulated under the proposed enforceable pro-
fessionalism standards because although the new professionalism standards 
require substantial or repeated offenses, the same was likely true of the use 
of Rule 4-8.4(d).110  For example, in Mitchell’s and Knowles’ respective cas-
es, had the attorneys’ statements not been so extreme, or repeated, and had 
other factors not been present, it is unlikely that a disciplinary action would 
have been filed or punishment would have been imposed.111 
  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at S509–10; Mitchell Report, supra note 95, at 2–3; Mooney Report, supra note 
96, at 2; see also R. REGULATING FLA. BAR, 4-8.4(d). 
 109. See Mitchell Report, supra note 95, at 3; Mooney Report, supra note 96, at 2; see 
also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT scope para. 14 (2012).  The Supreme Court of Florida 
has continuously acknowledged that the appropriate considerations for imposing discipline are 
threefold: 
[(1)] the judgment must be fair to society, both in terms of protecting the public from unethical 
conduct and at the same time not denying the public the services of a qualified lawyer as a re-
sult of undue harshness in imposing penalty; [(2)] the judgment must be fair to the respondent, 
being sufficient to punish a breach of ethics and at the same time encourage reformation and 
rehabilitation; [and (3)] the judgment must be severe enough to deter others who might be 
prone or tempted to become involved in like violations. 
Fla. Bar v. Behm, 41 So. 3d 136, 150 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Cohen, 919 
So. 2d 384, 388 (Fla. 2005) (per curiam); Fla. Bar v. Barrett, 897 So. 2d 1269, 1275–76 (Fla. 
2005) (per curiam); Fla. Bar v. Spear, 887 So. 2d 1242, 1246 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam); Fla. 
Bar v. Lord, 433 So. 2d 983, 986 (Fla. 1983) (per curiam)); see also Fla. Bar v. Liberman, 43 
So. 3d 36, 39 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam) (citing Fla. Bar v. Pahules, 233 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla. 
1970) (per curiam)).  Imposing discipline for unprofessional conduct in and of itself is in 
keeping with these goals of discipline.  See Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism 
Complaints, supra note 30. 
 110. See Mitchell Report, supra note 95, at 1–2; Mooney Report, supra note 96, at 1–2 
(supporting proposition that rule 4-8.4(d) implicitly requires substantial or repeated offenses); 
Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30; see also R. 
REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-8.4(d). 
 111. Mitchell Complaint, supra note 95, at 1–4; see Knowles, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at S508; 
Fla. Bar v. Mitchell, No. SC10-637, slip op. at 1 (Fla. Oct. 5, 2010).  For example, Knowles’ 
punishment was actually enhanced from a ninety-day suspension because it was not her first 
offense.  Knowles, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at S508.  Also, in Knowles’ case, she was not attacking 
another attorney or a witness, but was disparaging her own client.  Id. at S510.  The Supreme 
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Under newly proposed rules for enforcement of professionalism, re-
course to formal and informal sanctions may be much more readily available 
than before.112  Instead of relying on the catch-all provisions under the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct or the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, the 
proposed rules set additional, distinct standards that all attorneys must 
meet.113  Although these professionalism standards are only a step above the 
minimum requirements, it raises the bar for all practitioners.  While height-
ened professionalism is commendable, as explained later, Florida—and other 
states like it—need to be mindful to promote and advance the cause of pro-
fessionalism without compromising an attorney’s competing obligations to 
the client, the court, and the public.114 
3. A Proposed Florida Model for Resolving Complaints of Unprofessional 
Conduct 
Florida is one step closer to enforcing its proposed professionalism 
guidelines and disciplining those lawyers who fail to comply.115  The Florida 
Bar’s Commission on Professionalism has approved proposed rules for re-
solving professionalism complaints.116  The Commission approved the Attor-
ney Consumer Assistance and Intake Program Model (“ACAP Model”).117  
The ACAP Model involves a very simple rule, which then relies upon previ-
ously adopted professionalism goals and decisions from the Supreme Court 
of Florida for definition and form.118  The Standard of Professionalism, as set 
forth in the proposal, is that “[m]embers of The Florida Bar shall not engage 
in unprofessional conduct,” defined as “substantial or repeated violations of 
the Oath of Admission to The Florida Bar, The Florida Bar Creed of Profes-
sionalism, The Florida Bar Ideals and Goals of Professionalism, The Rules 
  
Court of Florida justifiably took a very dim view of Knowles’ actions because her actions, 
offensive in and of themselves, were that much worse because her defamatory remarks were 
directed at her own client.  See id. at S508, S510. 
 112. Compare R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-2.1, with Proposed Rules for Resolving Profes-
sionalism Complaints, supra note 30. 
 113. See Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30; see 
also R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-2.1; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT scope para. 19. 
 114. See SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 
73, at 6 & n.22, 7. 
 115. See Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30. 
 116. Id.  The Commission on Professionalism approved this model at its February 16, 
2012 meeting, and proposed these rules and regulations for public comment and approval by 
the Supreme Court of Florida, but they have not yet been formally adopted.  Id. 
 117. Id.; Blankenship, Disciplinary Sanctions, supra note 79. 
 118. See Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30; 
Blankenship, Disciplinary Sanctions, supra note 79. 
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Regulating The Florida Bar, or the decisions of The Florida Supreme 
Court.”119  What is evident at first glance is that this standard does not con-
template violation by the commission of a single act, unless that act is “sub-
stantial or repeated.”120  The reliance on prior Supreme Court of Florida deci-
sions, in addition to the professionalism guidelines that have been adopted by 
the Florida Bar, should assist in guiding the committees as these new rules 
evolve and are put into practice.121 
The proposal adopts existing bar grievance procedures to handle bar 
complaints and violations of The Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, which 
will make the rules easy to implement.122  Once a complaint is filed, the pro-
posal uses the intake attorney as a gatekeeper with initial discretion to re-
solve matters informally, including referral of a respondent attorney to ap-
propriate remedial professionalism programs.123  After an investigation, the 
complaint may be dismissed or forwarded “to the appropriate branch office 
of The Florida Bar’s Lawyer Regulation Department for further” review.124 
If a complaint is referred forward, the appropriate branch counsel has 
the discretion to “dismiss the [complaint] . . . , recommend Diversion . . . in 
accordance with Rule 3-5.3(d) of The Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, or 
refer to a Grievance Committee for further [consideration].”125  Rule 3-5.3(d) 
  
 119. Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Fla. Bar v. Ratiner, 46 So. 3d 35, 41–42 (2010) (per curiam); Fla. Bar v. Abram-
son, 3 So. 3d 964, 969 (2009) (per curiam); Fla. Bar v. Martocci, 791 So. 2d 1074, 1078 
(2001) (per curiam); Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 
30. 
 122. See Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30; see 
also R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.3(d) (2012).  There is also a local option that would permit 
judicial circuits to adopt Local Professionalism Panels to resolve some complaints of unpro-
fessional conduct within that circuit’s own legal community.  Proposed Rules for Resolving 
Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30.  The idea was to permit circuits to decide how 
much involvement they wanted to have—and likely had the resources to support—with re-
spect to dealing with professionalism complaints.  See id.  Under the current ACAP Model 
proposal, the Local Professionalism Panel would receive referrals of cases that the ACAP 
attorney determines could be handled informally.  Id. 
 123. Id.  In this context, remedial professionalism programs are identified as “Practice and 
Professionalism Enhancement Programs,” which are “[p]rograms operated either as a diver-
sion from disciplinary action or as a part of a disciplinary sanction that are intended to provide 
educational opportunities to members of the bar for enhancing skills and avoiding misconduct 
allegations” either with no investigation or determination of whether an investigation is re-
quired where a potential violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct may exist.  R. 
REGULATING. FLA. BAR 3-2.1(i); see Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Com-
plaints, supra note 30. 
 124. Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30. 
 125. Id.; R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.3(d). 
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provides that “[t]he bar shall not offer a respondent the opportunity to divert 
a disciplinary case that is pending at staff or grievance committee level in-
vestigations to a practice and professionalism enhancement program unless 
staff counsel, the grievance committee chair, and the designated reviewer 
concur.”126  Rule 3-5.3(b) contemplates “diversion to practice and profes-
sionalism enhancement programs” in cases where the case would be subject 
to a “finding of minor misconduct or by a finding of no probable cause with 
a letter of advice.”127  A lawyer may be referred to diversion only once every 
seven years.128 
The Grievance Committee is the final stop in the review process.129  
Upon review and consideration, the Grievance Committee makes one of five 
findings:  1) “No probable cause;” 2) “No probable cause [with] a letter of 
advice to the Respondent;” 3) “Recommendation of Diversion to [a] Practice 
and Professionalism Enhancement Program[];” 4) “Recommendation of Ad-
monishment for Minor Misconduct;” or 5) “Probable cause under Rule 3-2.1, 
[which] is a finding of guilt justifying disciplinary action.”130 
B. Examples of Other States’ Approaches to Discipline and Enforcement 
with Respect to Professionalism Issues 
Unlike Florida’s proposed rules for regulating professionalism, most 
states simply have aspirational goals for professionalism and civility.131  
Most do not intend for those goals to be enforceable through disciplinary 
proceedings.132  For example, Minnesota’s aspirational professionalism 
  
 126. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.3(d). 
 127. Id. R. 3-5.3(b). 
 128. Id. R. 3-5.3(c). 
 129. See Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30.  These 
options track with the traditional role of the Grievance Committee in Bar Proceedings for 
other violations.  See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-7.4(j), (k), (m), (o).  Rule 3-2.1(j) provides 
that probable cause is defined as “[a] finding by an authorized agency that there is cause to 
believe that a member of The Florida Bar is guilty of misconduct justifying disciplinary ac-
tion.”  Id. R. 3-2.1(j). 
 130. Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30; see R. 
REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-2.1(j), 3-7.4(j), (k), (m), (o). 
 131. See generally Professionalism Codes, supra note 31 (listing the states that have pro-
fessionalism or civility codes or goals); see also Gary J. Leppla, Professional Responsibilty:  
The Move from Bright Line Rules to Aspirational Disciplinary Standards, ALL RISE, Spring 
2008, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/news/allrise/2008/05/professional-responsibility-the-move-
from-bright-line-rules-to-aspirational-disciplinary-standards/. 
 132. E.g., LA. SUP. CT. GEN. ADMIN. R. pt. G, § 11, pmbl.; Professional Guidelines, supra 
note 31.  As noted earlier, Louisiana and Virginia’s codes specifically provide that failure to 
comply will not be used as a basis for sanctions or discipline.  LA. SUP. CT. GEN. ADMIN. R. pt. 
G, § 11, pmbl.; Professional Guidelines, supra note 31. 
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standards specifically state that they “are not intended to be used as a basis 
for discipline.”133  Yet Minnesota has sanctioned attorneys for unprofessional 
conduct.134  Like Minnesota, Maryland has also addressed unprofessional 
conduct without the benefit of enforceable professionalism standards.135  But, 
as with similar cases in Florida,136 the courts tend to rely on the catch-all pro-
vision of behavior that “is prejudicial to the administration of justice,” rather 
than being able to point to specific standards of professionalism or civility.137  
Often, the attorney disciplined has also violated a more specific rule of pro-
fessional conduct as well.138 
The Court of Appeals in Maryland suspended an attorney from the prac-
tice of law for ninety days based on conduct that was related to marital diffi-
culties, but resulted from him using vulgar language directed at colleagues 
and court staff, failing to cooperate with law enforcement in several situa-
tions, and otherwise behaving in a less than professional manner.139  On the 
one hand, the court acknowledged that an “[a]ttorney[] who cannot maintain 
[a] level of professional performance [that includes common courtesy and 
civility] must be disciplined,” but the court also acknowledged that 
“[a]ttorneys are not prohibited from using profane or vulgar language at all 
times and under all circumstances.”140  Instead, such language can be curbed 
when it “would be prejudicial to the administration of justice.”141 
A New Jersey court sanctioned an attorney for repeated instances of the 
use of vulgar name-calling, threatening, and abusive language toward oppos-
ing counsel, a New Jersey Transit investigator, and a trial judge’s law 
clerk.142  This was not Mr. Vincenti’s first appearance before the Disciplinary 
  
 133. Professionalism Aspirations, MINN. ST. B. ASS’N (2001), 
http://www2.mnbar.org/committees/professionalism/aspirations-final.htm. 
 134. See In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 314–15, 325 (Minn. 1990) (per curiam); In re 
Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394, 395 (Minn. 1987) (per curiam). 
 135. Compare In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d at 395, with Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Alison, 565 A.2d 660, 664, 668 (Md. 1989). 
 136. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Knowles, 37 Fla. L. Weekly S508, S509 (July 12, 2012) (per 
curiam); see also Standards for Lawyer Sanctions, FLA. B., www.floridabar.org (follow 
“Standards for Lawyer Sanctions” hyperlink under “Lawyer Regulation”) (last updated June 
6, 2011). 
 137. See Alison, 565 A.2d at 666. 
 138. See id. at 664. 
 139. Id. at 661–64, 668. 
 140. Id. at 666–67 (citing In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d at 397). 
 141. Id. at 667. 
 142. In re Vincenti (In re Vincenti II), 554 A.2d 470, 471 (N.J. 1989) (per curiam).  Vin-
centi told the trial judge’s law clerk to “get real,” that she did not know what she was doing, 
and that he was “not taking this fucking shit.”  Id. at 473.  He apparently called the Deputy 
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Review Board, nor before the Supreme Court of New Jersey, as he had been 
suspended from practice for similar conduct several years earlier.143 
The court found that Vincenti, again, had engaged in conduct that was 
prejudicial to the administration of justice and suspended him from the prac-
tice of law for three months.144  The court stated that “[c]onduct calculated to 
intimidate and distract those who, though in an adversarial position, have 
independent responsibilities and important roles in the effective administra-
tion of justice cannot be countenanced” and that such conduct would subject 
an attorney to discipline.145  The court explained that while “‘[u]nder some 
circumstances it might be difficult to determine precisely the point at which 
forceful, aggressive trial advocacy crosses the line into the forbidden territo-
ry of an ethical violation,’” Vincenti’s conduct, in both cases, clearly crossed 
that line.146 
Both of these cases involved extreme behavior issues, attorneys who 
were on some level “out of control.”147  And both reflect a desire to address 
professionalism issues that were underlying the designated offense of engag-
ing in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.148  Clearly, these 
are attorneys who were unlikely to behave, no matter what rules were in 
place.  But, in terms of helping attorneys whose unprofessional conduct does 
not rise to this level, it is worth considering whether enforceable standards, 
which would give clearer guidance as to the type of “civility” and “profes-
sionalism” required, would not be more beneficial and reach beyond cases 
with such extreme behavior.149  As Chief Justice Warren E. Burger observed: 
Lawyers who know how to think but have not learned how to be-
have are a menace and a liability not an asset to the administration 
of justice. . . . I suggest the necessity for civility is relevant to law-
yers because they are the living exemplars—and thus teachers—
every day in every case and in every court; and their worst conduct 
will be emulated . . . more readily than their best.150 
  
Attorney General who was serving as opposing counsel a “piece of shit,” challenged him to 
fight on at least two occasions, and used a threatening tone while dealing with him.  Id. at 472. 
 143. Id. at 470–71; In re Vincenti (In re Vincenti I), 458 A.2d 1268, 1274–75 (N.J. 1983) 
(per curiam). 
 144. In re Vincenti II, 554 A.2d at 473, 476. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 475–76 (quoting In re Vincenti I, 458 A.2d at 1268). 
 147. See id. at 473; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Alison, 565 A.2d 660, 666–68 (Md. 
1989). 
 148. See In re Vincenti II, 554 A.2d at 473–74; Alison, 565 A.2d at 668. 
 149. See Hubert, supra note 61, at 118–19, 121. 
 150. Id. at 113 (quoting Warren E. Burger). 
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C. A Parallel System Considered the Military 
Military attorneys, such as the Judge Advocate General Corps, are sub-
ject to the same type of Rules of Professional Conduct as civilian attor-
neys.151  In addition to the rules that guide the professional conduct of mili-
tary attorneys, the Department of Defense has promulgated ethical require-
ments that apply to all service members, including attorneys.152  Thus, ethics 
and professionalism for the military community as a whole are addressed 
from the top down.153 
Military employees are directed to “carefully consider ethical values 
when making decisions as part of official duties.”154  “Primary Ethical Val-
ues” are enumerated:  Truthfulness (which is required); straightforwardness; 
candor; integrity; loyalty; accountability (“includ[ing] avoiding even the 
appearance of impropriety”); fairness; caring; respect; promise keeping; re-
sponsible citizenship; and the pursuit of excellence.155  The Joint Ethics Reg-
ulation then provides that “job-related decisions . . . should be preceded by a 
consideration of ethical ramifications,”156 and a framework for an ethical 
decision-making plan is offered.157  Part of the ethical decision-making plan 
provides that a decision maker should “[b]e prepared to fall somewhat short 
of some goals for the sake of ethics and other considerations.”158  At the end 
of the day, The Joint Ethics Regulation indicates that unethical options 
should be eliminated.159  And, further, that the decision maker should commit 
to and implement the best ethical solution.160 
  
 151. AIR FORCE RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT introduction (2005). 
 152. See DEP’T OF DEF., THE JOINT ETHICS REGULATION § 2-200, at 18 (2011), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/550007r.pdf. 
 153. See AIR FORCE RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT introduction.  Having said this, clearly 
attorneys and other divisions may have additional ethical and professional conduct rules, but 
the Department of Defense guidelines provide a baseline from which the entire military com-
munity must proceed.  See DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 152, § 2-200, at 18.  For example, the 
Air Force Rules of Professional Conduct are adapted from the ABA Model Rules and are, for 
the most part, simply modified to reflect the realities of practice before military courts.  AIR 
FORCE RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT introduction.  The Introduction to the Air Force Rules 
indicates that:  “Beyond establishing minimum standards, the Rules are designed to meet three 
important objectives.  They provide workable guidance to Air Force lawyers, they are specific 
to the problems and needs of our practice, and they are accessible to Air Force lawyers as-
signed throughout the world.”  Id. 
 154. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 152, § 12-400, at 118. 
 155. Id. § 12-401, at 118–19. 
 156. Id. § 12-500, at 119. 
 157. See id. § 12-501, at 120–21. 
 158. Id. § 12-501, at 120. 
 159. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 152, § 12-501, at 120. 
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While a member of the Judge Advocate General Corps has familiar ob-
ligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct for that specific branch, 
the attorney also has ethical obligations as part of the larger military commu-
nity.161  Those obligations stress the importance of ethics first.162  And, failure 
to comply with the requirements of The Joint Ethics Regulation can result in 
administrative, criminal and civil sanctions.163 
IV. DEFAMATION AND THE DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY164 
Other than Louisiana and Georgia, every state has adopted a version of 
“absolute immunity for lawyers.”165  The Restatement of Torts Second pro-
vides that: 
An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory 
matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a 
proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the 
  
There may be solutions that seem to resolve the problem and reach the goal but which are 
clearly unethical.  Remember that short term solutions are not worth sacrificing our commit-
ment to ethics.  The long term problems of unethical solutions will not be worth the short term 
advantages.  Eliminate the unethical solutions. 
Id. 
 160. See id. at 121. 
 161. AIR FORCE RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT introduction (2005); DEP'T OF DEF., supra, 
note 152, § 1-406, at 10. 
 162. See AIR FORCE RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT introduction. 
 163. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 152, § 1, at 105.  Clearly, the military has an advantage 
over the ABA, the best comparator here, in that it has control over its employees.  See About 
the American Bar Association, AM. B. ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/utility/ 
about_the_aba.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).  The ABA is a voluntary organization, so it 
would be impossible to adopt mandatory professionalism standards.  See id.  However, states 
could accomplish this much in the way Florida has chosen to do so.  See R. REGULATING FLA. 
BAR 3-1.2 (2012). 
 164. This concept has been identified as the lawyer’s litigation privilege, the absolute 
litigation privilege, and absolute immunity.  Anenson, supra note 12, at 917–18, 920, 928–29; 
Douglas R. Richmond, The Lawyer’s Litigation Privilege, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 281, 283 
(2007).  While there are underlying reasons why one term may be preferable to the other, 
those reasons are tangential to the discussion in this article.  See id.  Here, the author uses the 
terms absolute immunity and privilege interchangeably, referring to the doctrine as one of 
absolute immunity, but when necessary, discussing it in the appropriate context as a “privi-
lege” as well.  For a more complete discussion regarding the use of the terms of privilege and 
immunity as they relate to absolute immunity, see Douglas R. Richmond’s, The Lawyer’s 
Litigation Privilege. 
 165. Anenson, supra note 12, at 917 & n.6. 
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course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he partici-
pates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding.166 
“The privilege applies regardless of malice, bad faith, or any nefarious 
motives on the part of the lawyer, so long as the conduct complained of has 
some relation to the litigation.”167  Generally, the immunity granted is abso-
lute, but it may also be qualified under certain circumstances.168 
Such broad immunity from defamation is arguably necessary because 
there is a need to protect an attorney who is trying to protect his client’s in-
terest—often under the most dire circumstances—from the specter of collat-
eral litigation aimed at his own behavior during trial.169  Imagine, for exam-
ple, a criminal defense attorney is faced with a sympathetic victim, a dead 
toddler, and a defendant, the toddler’s mother, who has a history of telling 
  
 166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1977); see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 
586 (1938) (“An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish false and defamatory mat-
ter of another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the 
institution of, or during the course and as a part of a judicial proceeding in which he partici-
pates as counsel, if it has some relation thereto.”).  Defamation is generally defined as a com-
munication that “‘tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation 
of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.’”  Paul T. 
Hayden, Reconsidering the Litigator’s Absolute Privilege to Defame, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 985, 
988 (1993).  But see N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (requiring 
actual malice for public officials).  Both Louisiana and Georgia offer qualified versions of 
absolute immunity.  See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-7(7) (2012) (“Comments of counsel, fairly 
made, on circumstances of a case in which he or she is involved and on the conduct of parties 
in connection therewith” is deemed privileged.); Freeman v. Cooper, 414 So. 2d 355, 356, 359 
(La. 1982) (citing Waldo v. Morrison, 58 So. 2d 210, 211 (La. 1952)) (proposing that “in 
order for privilege to apply, the statement must be material . . . with probable cause and with-
out malice”). 
 167. Anenson, supra note 12, at 918.  Louisiana has emphatically rejected the absolute 
nature of the privilege.  Id. at 917 n.6; see also Freeman, 414 So. 2d at 359.  The Supreme 
Court of Louisiana specifically held that such a policy of permitting malicious statements by 
counsel to be protected “‘has no place in the system of law prevailing in Louisiana.’”  Free-
man, 414 So. 2d at 359 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Sabine Tram Co. v. Jurgens, 79 So. 872, 
873 (La. 1918)). 
 168. See Richmond, supra note 164, at 284; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
586 (1977).  “A privilege is [considered] absolute when it cannot be [defeated] by a defend-
ant’s malic[ious]” behavior but, if the privilege is qualified, then a plaintiff may defeat it and 
strip a defendant of immunity if the plaintiff can prove malicious conduct.  Richmond, supra 
note 164, at 284. 
 169. Green Acres Trust v. London, 688 P.2d 617, 621 (Ariz. 1984) (quoting Van Vechten 
Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation:  Judicial Proceedings, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 463, 482 
(1909)).  Or, put another way, “‘[t]o subject him to actions for defamation would fetter and 
restrain him in the fearless discharge of the duty which he owes to his client, and which the 
successful administration of justice demands.’”  Id. (quoting Veeder, supra note 169, at 482). 
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lies; intricately involved lies.170  His client is accused of first-degree premedi-
tated murder.171  She is portrayed in the media as cold and uncaring—a 
mother who “fail[ed] to report her daughter missing for [thirty-one] days.”172  
There is no real physical evidence tying her to the death, it is mostly circum-
stantial, and there is no proof to show how the child died.173  The attorney 
needs to tell the jury something—needs to offer a theory of the case that ex-
plains the dead toddler, his client’s behavior, and his client’s innocence.174  
These are significant obstacles in defending his client.175  Thus, the defense 
team crafts a theory of the case, and in doing so, draws others into the story 
accusing them of unspeakable crimes.176 
In his opening statement, attorney Jose Baez offered the following ex-
planation for Caylee Anthony’s death.177  Caylee disappeared on the morning 
of June 16, 2008, and was discovered by George Anthony, Casey Anthony’s 
father, in the family’s swimming pool.178  He yelled at Casey and told her she 
  
 170. Anthony Colarossi, Casey Anthony’s Avalanche of Lies:  Jury Left to Decide What’s 
True, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 26, 2011, at A1. 
 171. Register of Actions, ORANGE COUNTY CLERK CTS., 
http://myclerk.orangeclerk.com/default.aspx (follow “Criminal and Traffic Case Records” 
hyperlink; then search “Last Name” for “Anthony” and “First Name” for “Casey” and “Mid-
dle Name” for “Marie;” then click “Search;” then follow “2008-CF-015606-A-O” hyperlink) 
(last visited October 28, 2012). 
 172. See The Detail That Could Doom Casey Anthony, NBCNEWS.COM (July 5, 2011, 
11:04 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43639517/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/detail-
could-doom-casey-anthony#ulmDM9fcwy. 
 173. Gregory Kane, Anthony Verdict May Signal Death of Circumstantial Evidence, 
WASH. EXAMINER, July 6, 2011, http://washingtonexaminer.com/anthony-verdict-may-signal-
death-of-circumstantial-evidence/article/40352#.UDu-YaBQS7o. 
 174. See The Detail That Could Doom Casey Anthony, supra note 172. 
 175. See id. 
 176. See Jessica Hopper & Ashleigh Banfield, Casey Anthony Trial:  Defense Team 
Claims Caylee Anthony Drowned in Family Pool, ABC NEWS (May 24, 2011), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/casey_anthony_trial/casey-anthony-trial-defense-claims-caylee-
anthony-drowned/story?id=13674375#.UDvElaBQS7o.  The author presumes that this is 
information provided to Baez by his client, and that he relied upon her information because 
confirming it would have been difficult under the circumstances if no documentation existed. 
 177. CochiseLiberty, Defense Winning:  Opening Statement Part 1 (of 2), YOU TUBE, at 
0:35 (June 6, 2011), http://www.youtube.com (search “Defense Winning:  Opening Statement 
Part 1 (of 2),” then choose the video by CochiseLiberty) [hereinafter CochiseLiberty, Defense 
Winning:  Opening Statement Part 1 (of 2)]. 
 178. Id. at 1:00; CochiseLiberty, Defense Winning:  Opening Statement Part 2 (of 2), YOU 
TUBE, at 7:07 (June 6, 2011), http://www.youtube.com (search “Defense Winning:  Opening 
Statement Part 2 (of 2),” then choose the video by CochiseLiberty) [hereinafter CochiseLiber-
ty, Defense Winning:  Opening Statement Part 2 (of 2)].  But see Sunsentinelmobile, George 
Anthony Called as First Witness, Denies Molesting Casey, YOU TUBE, at 0:03 (May 24, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com (search “George Anthony Called as First Witness, Denies Molesting 
Casey,” then choose the video by Sunsentinelmobile). 
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would be blamed.179  Father and daughter covered up the death, failing to 
report it or otherwise give any indication Caylee was dead to anyone else.180  
The problem, of course, was that Casey was a liar and George Anthony, 
while not without some suspicion, would deny this.181  Then Baez introduced 
his explanation for Casey’s behavior and why she was not culpable—she had 
been taught from an early age to lie.182  Baez told the jury, and the watching 
world, that “it all began when Casey was eight years old and her father came 
into her room and began to touch her inappropriately.”183  “She could be thir-
teen years old, have her father’s penis in her mouth, and then go to school 
and play with the other kids as if nothing ever happened.”184  Baez went so 
far as to accuse Casey’s brother of the same incestuous behavior, indicating 
that he was “follow[ing] in his father’s footsteps.”185  At no point did Baez 
have to prove the truth of these allegations, and at no point did he have to 
corroborate the story of Casey’s sexual abuse.186  The only response would 
come from George Anthony, who denied that Caylee drowned in the pool 
and denied that he sexually abused his daughter.187 
If Baez had been subject to civil liability, would he have taken the same 
approach?  Could Baez risk making such allegations against a prosecution 
witness without being cloaked in the protection offered by absolute immuni-
ty?  Perhaps not.  But this scenario is the quintessential reason why such pro-
tection exists.  At trial, at the moment when a lawyer must be unfettered in 
his ability to fully represent his client, this immunity cloaks his actions in 
order to realize complete, zealous representation.188  The argument is that the 
collateral damage it may cause is an acceptable byproduct that serves the 
  
 179. CochiseLiberty, Defense Winning:  Opening Statement Part 2 (of 2), supra note 178, 
at 6:05, 7:23. 
 180. See id. at 7:48. 
 181. See Sunsentinelmobile, supra note 178, at 0:51, 2:12; CochiseLiberty, Defense Win-
ning:  Opening Statement Part 1 (of 2), supra note 177, at 3:22, 7:04; CochiseLiberty, Defense 
Winning:  Opening Statement Part 2 (of 2), supra note 178, at 4:35. 
 182. CochiseLiberty, Defense Winning:  Opening Statement Part 1 (of 2), supra note 177, 
at 4:55–7:12. 
 183. Id. at 5:00. 
 184. CochiseLiberty, Defense Winning:  Opening Statement Part 2 (of 2), supra note 178, 
at 4:44. 
 185. Id. at 3:00.  Baez even dragged Cindy Anthony into the web of lies, claiming she 
deliberately lied to friends and family about Casey being pregnant.  Id. at 0:47. 
 186. Curt Anderson, Attorney:  Casey Anthony Rejected Early Plea Deal, SALON (July 5, 
2012, 8:55 AM), 
http://www.salon.com/2012/07/05/attorney_casey_anthony_rejected_early_plea_deal/. 
 187. See Sunsentinelmobile, supra note 178, at 0:16, 1:10. 
 188. Hayden, supra note 166, at 1038. 
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larger purpose of administering justice.189  But, as was noted at the outset of 
this section, other jurisdictions have managed to tether this immunity in a 
manner that may strike a better balance between overzealous, disingenuous 
trial tactics and zealous advocacy that remains truthful to the best of its abil-
ity.190 
Those jurisdictions that recognize absolute immunity in its purest form 
will apply it to defamation claims and other tortious claims191 made against 
attorneys.192  In order to invoke absolute immunity, there must first be litiga-
tion or a proceeding pending, or the same must be “contemplated in good 
faith.”193  Second, the attorney needs to be participating as counsel.194  Third, 
the communication, or in some cases the conduct, needs to have “‘some rela-
tion to the proceeding’” or contemplated proceeding.195 
  
 189. See id. at 1026, 1038. 
 190. See supra text accompanying notes 165–69.  As a practical matter, requiring reasona-
ble inquiry may not be a bad thing.  Thinking through how to approach what may otherwise 
be defamatory statements while still preserving a client’s best interests is not impossible, as 
Louisiana has demonstrated. 
 191. Courts have extended this immunity beyond defamation to other types of torts, in-
cluding tortious interference with business relationships, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, negligence, conspiracy, and invasion of privacy.  Richmond, supra note 164, at 296–
97.  Richmond notes that only malicious prosecution, fraud claims, and now potentially Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act actions have been held to fall outside the privilege.  Id. at 297.  
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the privilege, while initially developed to protect against 
liability for defamatory acts, has “been extended to cover all acts related to and occurring 
within judicial proceedings.”  Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1274 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (citing Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire 
Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 607–08 (Fla. 1994)).  Similarly, the court in Thornton v. Rhoden 
justified extending the privilege to other tortious acts, stating that “[t]he salutary purpose of 
the privilege should not be frustrated by putting a new label on the complaint.”  Thornton v. 
Rhoden, 53 Cal. Rptr. 706, 719 (Ct. App. 1966).  Hayden noted that the privilege has been 
applied to quasi-judicial proceedings as well, including “a board of funeral directors and em-
balmers, . . . a school board [proceeding], . . . [and] a state labor commission.”  Hayden, supra 
note 166, at 994. 
 192. See Stepanek v. Delta Cnty., 940 P.2d 364, 368 (Colo. 1997) (en banc) (citing Bris-
coe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983)); Mozzochi v. Beck, 529 A.2d 171, 173 (Conn. 1987) 
(citing Petyan v. Ellis, 510 A.2d 1337, 1338 (Conn. 1986)); Ferry v. Carlsmith, 23 Haw. 589, 
591 (1917); Libco Corp. v. Adams, 426 N.E.2d 1130, 1131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (citing Weiler 
v. Stern, 384 N.E.2d 762, 763 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Macie v. Clark Equip. Co., 290 N.E.2d 
912, 913 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1977)).  Instead, 
Louisiana applies a modified version of absolute immunity, allowing such protection as long 
as the statement is material, and “made with probable cause and without malice.”  Freeman v. 
Cooper, 414 So. 2d 355, 359 (La. 1982) (citing Waldo v. Morrison, 58 So. 2d 210, 211 (La. 
1952)). 
 193. Richmond, supra note 164, at 301. 
 194. Id. at 284. 
 195. Id. at 284, 301 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586). 
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For the most part, the courts focus on a relevant nexus between the 
communication made and a pending or potential judicial or quasi-judicial 
proceeding.196  If the communication or conduct is too far removed from the 
official proceedings—either in time, content, or audience—then it may not 
be protected.197  For example, courts found that statements made by attorneys 
during a press conference are not protected by absolute immunity because 
“the news media [generally] lacks a sufficient relationship to [the] . . . pro-
ceeding[].”198  But, many courts permit statements made both pre-litigation 
and post-litigation to be immune, as long as the statements bear the requisite 
relation to the proceeding itself.199 
  
 196. Adams v. Ala. Lime & Stone Corp., 142 So. 424, 425 (Ala. 1932) (quoting Moore v. 
Mfrs.’ Nat’l Bank, 25 N.E. 1048, 1049 (N.Y. 1890)); Rosenfeld, Myer & Susman v. Cohen, 
194 Cal. Rptr. 180, 200 (Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 
106 Cal. Rptr. 718, 722 (Ct. App. 1973)) (requiring that a statement have a logical nexus to 
the proceeding)).  Relevance is a qualification.  Adams, 142 So. at 425 (quoting Moore, 25 
N.E. at 1049).  The privilege “‘extends only to such matters as are relevant or material to the 
litigation, [declining to] protect slanderous imputations plainly irrelevant and impertinent, 
voluntarily made, and which the party making them could not reasonably have supposed to be 
relevant.’”  Id. (quoting Moore, 25 N.E. at 1049); see also Green Acres Trust v. London, 688 
P.2d 617, 621 (Ariz. 1984) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 cmt. c) (citing 
Bailey v. Superior Court, 636 P.2d 144, 146 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981)) (holding that “the defama-
tory publication must relate to, bear on, or be connected with the proceeding,” but “need not 
be ‘strictly relevant;’ [it] . . . need only have ‘some reference to the subject matter’”); Pogue v. 
Cooper, 680 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Ark. 1984) (quoting Westridge v. Wright, 466 F. Supp. 234, 
237 (E.D. Ark. 1979)) (providing that statements must be “‘relevant and pertinent’” to the 
proceeding); Malmin v. Engler, 864 P.2d 179, 182–83 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (holding that 
“communications [arose] ‘in the due course of a judicial proceeding,’ [and they] . . . ‘were 
reasonably related to that . . . proceeding’”). 
 197. See Adams, 142 So. at 425; Green Acres Trust, 688 P.2d at 622, 624 (citing Asay v. 
Hallmark Cards, Inc., 594 F.2d 692, 697 (8th Cir. 1979)); Malmin, 864 P.2d at 182. 
 198. Green Acres Trust, 688 P.2d at 622 (citing Asay, 594 F.2d at 697); Bradley, 106 Cal. 
Rptr. at 724; Kennedy v. Cannon, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (Md. 1962); Barto v. Felix, 378 A.2d 927, 
931 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977); see also Meier v. Hamilton Standard Elec. Sys., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 
296, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that absolute privilege may be waived by circulation of 
defamatory material to parties not involved in a grievance process). 
 199. See Asay, 594 F.2d at 697; Bradley, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 724; Fridovich v. Fridovich, 
598 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Ange v. State, 123 So. 916, 917 (Fla. 1929)).  Courts 
have limited immunity to some extent when dealing with pretrial investigations, such as the 
limitation placed upon private individuals who make statements to police or to a state attor-
ney’s office before criminal charges are filed.  Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 69.  But even in those 
instances, attorneys often still enjoy immunity, where it simply becomes qualified rather than 
absolute.  See id. (noting immunity in the context of statements to police officers, and that the 
majority of states that have addressed this issue have embraced qualified immunity).  But see 
Moore v. Bailey, 628 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (quoting Spain v. Connolly, 606 
S.W.2d 540, 543 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980)).  While it might seem that qualified immunity might 
limit protection, as a practical matter, “a plaintiff would [still] have to establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the defamatory statements were false and uttered with common 
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The touchstone for absolute immunity is the relationship between the 
communication, the audience to which it is made, and the proceeding to 
which it arguably attaches.200  In determining whether the “proceeding” re-
quirement of the nexus is met, courts have often set the outer boundaries 
differently.201  For example, in Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecommunications,202 
the Eleventh Circuit noted that both New Jersey and California would in-
clude settlement negotiations and agreements as part of a “proceeding,” but 
in at least one Florida case, the court only extended qualified immunity to 
pre-suit settlement discussions.203 
The problem with all of this, as courts have noted, is that, the further 
removed an immune statement is from the actual proceeding, the less protec-
tion is available to the party that is defamed or injured by tortious conduct.204  
Jose Baez made statements about George Anthony in front of a judge,205 on 
the record, and Anthony was able to take the witness stand and respond to 
those allegations.206  The same cannot be said for statements made by an at-
torney in a pretrial investigation of a case, including interviews with poten-
tial witnesses.207  The harm identified is deemed acceptable because as many 
courts point out, the court still has the power to sanction attorneys, attorneys 
are still subject to disciplinary action, and criminal sanctions are also possi-
  
law express malice.”  Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 69 (citing Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 
806–07 (Fla. 1984)).  So, a plaintiff is still left with the burden of demonstrating that the “pri-
mary motive in making the statements was the intent to injure the reputation of the plaintiff.”  
Id. (citing Nodar, 462 So. 2d at 806). 
 200. See Richmond, supra note 164, at 285. 
 201. Compare Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1275–76 (11th Cir. 
2004), with Pledger v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1323, 1325–27 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 
App. 1983) (quoting Ange, 123 So. at 917). 
 202. 372 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 203. Id. at 1275 & n.26, 1276 (citing Pledger, 432 So. 2d at 1326–28).  The Eleventh 
Circuit agreed with the Third Circuit’s holding that “‘the negotiation of a settlement is a part 
of a judicial proceeding,’” and the “non-party insurer was absolutely immune from a defama-
tion claim based on statements made at a settlement conference.”  Id. at 1276 (quoting Petty v. 
Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 365 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir. 1966)).  But, the 
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeals had found that 
statements made during settlement discussions before suit was filed were subject only to qual-
ified immunity.  Id. at 1275 n.26 (citing Pledger, 432 So. 2d at 1326–28). 
 204. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 69; Moore v. Bailey, 628 S.W.2d 431, 431 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1981). 
 205. See CochiseLiberty, Defense Winning:  Opening Statement Part 1 (of 2), supra note 
177, at 5:05–9:15. 
 206. Sunsentinelmobile, supra note 178, at 0:01–2:34. 
 207. See Moore, 628 S.W.2d at 431 (citing Spain, 606 S.W.2d at 543). 
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ble.208  However, if the likelihood is minimal that these remedies will be in-
voked, how can a balance of rights be maintained?  Once again, there is a 
gray zone—that intangible place between what can be done and what should 
be done—where the outer limits of absolute immunity intersect with the 
heightened standards of new professionalism requirements presenting a prac-
tical problem for lawyers as they try to discern how to reconcile these com-
peting interests. 
V. ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY AT ODDS WITH NEW PROFESSIONALISM–A CASE 
STUDY 
I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to 
me such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and 
will never seek to mislead the judge or jury by any artifice or false 
statement of fact or law. 
. . . . 
I will abstain from all offensive personality and advance no fact 
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless 
required by the justice of the cause with which I am charged.209 
 
The protection of absolute immunity will likely always be available to 
protect attorneys from civil liability.210  And it is unlikely that an attorney 
will be disciplined for the same conduct under the rules of professional re-
sponsibility for defamation alone.211  The question becomes, however, how to 
  
 208. Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. 1995) (citing Ruberton v. Gabage, 654 
A.2d 1002, 1007 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); Kirschstein v. Haynes, 788 P.2d 941, 950–
51 (Okla. 1990)); see also O’Neil v. Cunningham, 173 Cal. Rptr. 422, 428 (Ct. App. 1981) 
(acknowledging that while an attorney could not be subject to civil liability for a breach of 
trust, it “may subject him to disciplinary action”); Higgs v. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d 840, 865 
(Colo. 1985) (en banc) (Erickson, J., dissenting) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 
515–16 (1978)) (agreeing with the majority that alternate remedies are available in absolute 
immunity cases); Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barret & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So. 2d 380, 
384 (Fla. 2007) (citing Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. 
Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608–09 (Fla. 1994)) (finding that a trial court’s contempt power 
and disciplinary measures in the state court system and bar association are remedies to address 
this type of misconduct). 
 209. Oath of Admission to The Florida Bar, supra note 75 (emphasis added). 
 210. See Anenson, supra note 12, at 918–20. 
 211. See, e.g., DelMonico v. Traynor, 50 So. 3d 4, 7–8 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.) (citing 
Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608; Fernandez v. Haber & Ganguzza, LLP, 30 So. 3d 644, 647 (Fla. 3d 
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reconcile this common law protection, and the practices associated with it, 
with a focus shifting to enforcing professionalism.  Will this shift mean that 
state bars and courts will begin to do what they have apparently been unwill-
ing to do in this context:  Impose disciplinary consequences for attorneys 
who go too far even if the law imposes no comparable consequence and in-
stead affirmatively permits the behavior? 
The Supreme Court of Florida recently heard a case, which serves as a 
perfect example of when an attorney’s otherwise permissible and immune 
conduct may exceed the standards of professionalism.212  The case of Del-
Monico v. Traynor213 offers a glimpse of how an attorney’s conduct went too 
far, but no mechanism was available to reach behind the cloak of immunity 
to correct clearly unprofessional actions.214 
Daniel DelMonico, the owner of MYD Marine Distributor, sued Do-
novan Marine and Tony Crespo, for defamation alleging that Crespo told 
others that DelMonico stole business from Donovan by supplying prostitutes 
to prospective clients.215  Arthur Traynor, an experienced litigator,216 was 
hired to defend Donovan Marine.217  During his pre-trial investigation, Tray-
nor spoke to several potential witnesses about the suit, including two of 
DelMonico’s ex-wives, a former employee, and “principals of other marine 
services companies.”218 
According to DelMonico’s defamation complaint against Traynor, 
Traynor had advised the potential witnesses that DelMonico used prostitutes 
to get business.219 
Specifically, DelMonico alleged that Traynor did the following:  1) 
Traynor told one of DelMonico’s ex-wives that DelMonico took business 
“away from Donovan by enticing [Donovan’s] purchasing agent with prosti-
tutes;” 2) Traynor told another ex-wife “that DelMonico was being prosecut-
ed for using prostitution to get business;” 3) Traynor contacted one of Del-
Monico’s former employees and told “him that DelMonico’s method to take 
an account was to supply a prostitute to the owner.”  Traynor then “encour-
  
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam); Stucchio v. Tincher, 726 So. 2d 372, 375 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. 
App. 1999)), review granted, 47 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2010). 
 212. See Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 13:12. 
 213. 50 So. 3d 4 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 47 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2010). 
 214. See id. at 12 (Warner, J., dissenting). 
 215. Id. at 6 (majority opinion).  Both DelMonico’s company, MYD Marine Distributor, 
and Donovan Marine, are marine services companies.  See id. 
 216. See A. Rodger Traynor Jr., AKERMAN, http://www.akerman.com/bios/bio.asp?id= 
466&name=Traynor,Jr. (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
 217. See DelMonico, 50 So. 3d at 6. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
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aged the . . . employee to provide additional examples of DelMonico’s ‘un-
ethical business practices;’” 4) Traynor contacted a former business owner 
and told him “that DelMonico was ‘being prosecuted for prostitution;’” and 
5) Traynor “contacted principals of other marine services companies” and 
conveyed to them that DelMonico was being prosecuted “for procuring pros-
titutes and illegal business dealings,” further representing to these potential 
witnesses that he was part of the prosecution.220 
Traynor sought summary judgment in the defamation case based on ab-
solute immunity because all of the communications with the potential wit-
nesses were in furtherance of his defense of his client during pending litiga-
tion.221  DelMonico argued that absolute immunity was inapplicable because 
developing a witness for litigation was not encompassed with the concept of 
“in the course of judicial proceedings.”222 
The trial court found that absolute immunity attached to Traynor’s 
statements and that DelMonico could not maintain a civil cause of action for 
defamation or tortious interference based on those statements as a matter of 
law.223  The trial court, relying on the Supreme Court of Florida’s decision in 
Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire 
Insurance Co.,224 held that absolute immunity reached interviews with poten-
tial witnesses in a pending case.225 
The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court and held 
that absolute immunity applied because the statements complained of “bore 
‘some relation’ to the proceeding” and were made “while [Traynor] was act-
ing as defense counsel.”226  And, as many courts before it have done, the 
  
 220. Id. 
 221. See id. 
 222. Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 9:54, 17:08 (discussing Levin, Middlebrooks, Ma-
bie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. 1994)). 
 223. See DelMonico, 50 So. 3d at 5–6. 
 224. 639 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1994). 
 225. DelMonico, 50 So. 3d at 7 (citing Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608). 
 226. Id. at 7 (quoting Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608).  The appellate court clarified that absolute 
immunity extended to interviews of potential witnesses connected to pending litigation.  Id. 
(citing Stucchio v. Tincher, 726 So. 2d 372, 373–75 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).  The court 
also noted that other jurisdictions had come to similar conclusions, and in some instances, 
gone even further, finding that the doctrine applies to statements made before suit is even 
initiated.  Id. at 7–8 (citing Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1276 (11th Cir. 
2004); Pettitt v. Levy, 104 Cal. Rptr. 650, 654 (Ct. App. 1972); Jones v. Coward, 666 S.E.2d 
877, 880 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); Russell v. Clark, 620 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); 
Pratt v. Nelson, 164 P.3d 366, 376 (Utah 2007)). 
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court noted that “‘[t]here could be ‘discipline of the courts, the bar associa-
tion, and the state’ if there was misconduct.’”227 
The Supreme Court of Florida heard oral arguments in this matter on a 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari after the Fourth District Court of Appeals af-
firmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Traynor.228  The case re-
mains pending before the Supreme Court of Florida.229 
While the court in DelMonico focused on the application of the law and 
the reach of absolute immunity, there is another underlying question that 
remains, one that speaks directly to professionalism.230  Did Traynor need to 
employ these methods to appropriately represent his client?  In other words, 
just because he could say these things and avoid civil liability, does that 
mean he should have or that there should be no consequences for his deci-
sion?231  If you accept the balancing test offered as a rationale for absolute 
immunity, there should nevertheless be some consequence for behavior that 
is unprofessional.  Inasmuch as such behavior is rarely addressed through 
disciplinary proceedings, don’t the new professionalism standards present an 
opportunity to rectify that oversight?  Indeed, there is a strong argument that 
the proposed professionalism standards in Florida will require action. 
From Traynor’s perspective, is it fair to second guess his decisions and 
strategy in preparing for his client’s defense?  Is it fair to subject him to dis-
cipline?  The answer here has to be yes because the argument for permitting 
  
 227. Id. at 8 (quoting Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608).  Other than the obvious irony that such 
discipline is not often visited upon attorneys in these circumstances, it is difficult to conceive 
of how a court could discipline or otherwise correct statements made prior to litigation being 
filed since the jurisdiction of the court has yet to be invoked when pre-suit statements are 
contemplated.  See Pledger v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1323, 1326–27 (Fla. 4th Dist. 
Ct. App. 1983); Curtis, supra note 57, at 235; Erno D. Lindner, Comment, Torts—Simpson 
Strong-Tie v. Stewart:  Balancing the Protection of Individuals with the Freedom of the Judi-
cial Process in Tennessee Attorney Solicitations, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1093, 1101 (2009).  On 
the other hand, when confronted with unprofessional behavior or flat-out deceit by an attor-
ney, even if cloaked by the protection of absolute immunity, how can a court not take action 
and report the matter? 
 228. See DelMonico, 50 So. 3d at 6; see also Oral Argument, supra note 57. 
 229. DelMonico v. Traynor Case Docket, FLA SUPREME CT., 
http://jweb.flcourts.org/pls/docket/ds_docket_search (search by “case number,” then select 
“SC10” for “FSC case number” field, enter “1397,” then select “submit”) (last visited Oct. 28, 
2012). 
 230. See DelMonico, 50 So. 3d at 5–8. 
 231. To be clear, Traynor denied saying that DelMonico was being prosecuted for prosti-
tution, which was easily the most egregious statement he allegedly made, but for the purposes 
of this discussion, the author assumes all of the statements were made by Traynor.  Id. at 6.  
Additionally, even if Traynor did not indicate that DelMonico was being prosecuted, there is 
something about the way he chose to conduct his interviews and the way he approached the 
witnesses.  Id. 
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such far-reaching immunity is that the same behavior is kept in check by the 
consequences constantly enumerated by the courts, namely, inherent power 
of the trial courts, bar discipline, and even procedural rules, such as Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 11.232 
VI. HOW CAN THE ATTORNEY’S OBLIGATIONS TO HIS CLIENT AND THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF NEW PROFESSIONALISM STANDARDS BE RECONCILED? 
Enforcing professionalism is yet another way that improper conduct is 
addressed by the self-regulating legal profession.  Inherently, these standards 
stand for the proposition that certain types of attorney conduct are subject to 
a heightened level of regulation and scrutiny—including honesty, fair deal-
ing, and courtesy.  In and of themselves, they are laudable goals that should 
be given form to move the entire legal community forward to a better place 
and better clarify expectations—professional and otherwise—for the legal 
community. 
The problem, however, is that these same provisions create a tension 
between what a lawyer can do, and what a lawyer should do.  Absolute im-
munity provides a perfect example of this tension.233  In effect, “the privi-
lege’s . . . immuniz[ation] [of] lawyer conduct is at odds with many other 
legal provisions that condemn the very same conduct.”234 
In Traynor’s case, clearly he did not have to convey to any potential 
witnesses that DelMonico was being prosecuted for prostitution.235  If this 
were true, then Traynor would have independent verification of that fact 
  
 232. Hayden, supra note 166, at 1037–38; Ronald E. Mallen & James A. Roberts, The 
Liability of a Litigation Attorney to a Party Opponent, 14 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 387, 393 
(1977–1978).  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) provides that “[b]y presenting . . . a 
pleading, written motion, or other paper [to the court]—whether by signing, filing, submitting, 
or later advocating it—an attorney . . . certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, 
information, and belief,” after reasonable inquiry, “it is not being presented for [an] improper 
purpose;” there are no frivolous legal claims and facts, contentions, or denials have eviden-
tiary support.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).  This rule has been enforced in the federal courts when an 
attorney has filed a factually deficient pleading and it does not appear justice has ground to a 
halt.  Robeson Def. Comm. v. Britt (In re Kunstler), 914 F.2d 505, 514–15, 525 (4th Cir. 
1990); Coates v. United Parcel Servs., 933 F. Supp. 497, 499–500 (D. Md. 1996).  Surely, an 
attorney could be held to a comparable standard of reasonable inquiry in matters where defa-
mation may be a factor without significant repercussions to absolute immunity if the only 
sanctions were disciplinary in nature.  See, e.g., In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 322 (Minn. 
1990) (per curiam) (citing In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95 (Ind. 1979) (per curiam)). 
 233. Hayden, supra note 166, at 1037. 
 234. Id. 
 235. See DelMonico v. Traynor, 50 So. 3d 4, 6 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 
47 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2010). 
2002] RECONCILING ATTORNEY CONDUCT 149 
from another source, such as a police investigation, a police report, or other 
official source.  Traynor also should not have represented or permitted the 
impression that he was involved in the prosecution.236  Not only does this run 
afoul of the standards of professional conduct, but it arguably created a dif-
ferent dynamic when he was interviewing presumably unrepresented lay 
witnesses.237 
It is easy to imagine that Traynor could have obtained similar results by 
simply telling each potential witness that DelMonico was suing Crespo and 
Donovan for telling others he was using prostitutes to gain business.238  
Traynor could also have asked the witnesses if they were aware of DelMon-
ico’s business practices.239  If Traynor determined the witnesses knew noth-
ing, he need not have conveyed further information about the alleged use of 
prostitutes.  And, if he was unsure, Traynor could have chosen to depose 
those witnesses affording DelMonico and his counsel an opportunity to par-
ticipate in the process.240 
Regardless of what Traynor could or should have done, the bigger ques-
tion is whether Traynor should be subject to disciplinary sanctions for his 
unprofessional conduct even if what he did was otherwise protected by abso-
lute immunity and, perhaps, not even in violation of the rules of professional 
conduct.  Courts that are presented with these cases in the context of civil 
liability raise the issue of enforcement and balance,241 but it does not appear 
that they act even when directly confronted with an attorney’s unprofessional 
behavior.  If professionalism becomes enforceable, then the new question 
will be whether an attorney’s behavior was sufficiently substantial or repeat-
ed to necessitate discipline, and how discipline should be imposed.  There is 
a need for zealous representation, and there is a need to thoroughly vet po-
tential witnesses in a pending case.242  But when does it cross the line, and 
how do you regulate those judgment calls?  Such judgment calls are clearly 
made in the moment.  While it would be difficult to fashion a bright line rule 
for this sort of conduct, clearer guidance would be helpful. 
The treatment of another type of immunity—from defamation—in dis-
ciplinary cases may offer some insight into how to fashion a rule for discipli-
  
 236. See id. 
 237. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2012); see DelMonico, 50 So. 3d at 12 
(Warner, J., dissenting). 
 238. See DelMonico, 50 So. 3d at 6 (majority opinion). 
 239. See id. 
 240. Id. at 12 (Warner, J., dissenting). 
 241. Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 24:41–27:09. 
 242. See Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608. 
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nary proceedings that will balance the current application of absolute im-
munity with newly enforceable professionalism standards.243 
In In re Graham,244 Graham filed an action for injunction in federal 
court alleging that the County Attorney, Rathke, filed a criminal action 
against his client as retaliation against Graham.245  The Federal Magistrate, 
McNulty, found in favor of the County Attorney.246  Graham then sent a let-
ter to the United States Attorney alleging that Rathke, Rathke’s attorney, 
another Federal Judge, Spellacy, and McNulty conspired to fix the result of 
the criminal action.247  Graham made the accusations of judicial misconduct 
public, so the Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit reviewed Graham’s com-
plaint and found no evidence that even suggested judicial misconduct.248 
Ultimately, a referee concluded that Graham’s statements regarding the 
integrity of the federal judge, the magistrate, and the county attorney were 
made without basis and fact, and with reckless disregard for their truth or 
falsity.249  The Supreme Court of Minnesota considered Graham’s claims of 
absolute immunity under the First Amendment and the Petition Clause.250  
The court apparently considered the matter in this context because the de-
famatory statements were made about public officials—a judge, a magistrate, 
and a county attorney—and Graham was charged with violating Rule 8.2(a), 
Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct.251 
The court found that First Amendment protection for an attorney’s criti-
cism of judges’ integrity or conduct was limited and subject to an application 
of an objective standard to determine actual malice when related to attorney 
disciplinary proceedings, rather than the subjective standard generally ap-
  
 243. See, e.g., In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 322 (Minn. 1990) (per curiam) (quoting In 
re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95 (Ind. 1979) (per curiam)). 
 244. 453 N.W.2d 313 (Minn. 1990) (per curiam). 
 245. Id. at 316–17. 
 246. Id. at 317. 
 247. Id. at 317–18. 
 248. Id. at 318 n.3.  Graham made similar accusations in a motion to recuse the magistrate 
from hearing an attorney’s fees motion, but these were found to be false by the referee in the 
disciplinary proceeding as well.  In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d at 319. 
 249. Id.; see also MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.2(a), 8.4(d) (2011). 
 250. In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d at 319–20; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 251. In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d at 314–15, 319–20; see also MINN. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 8.2(a).  Graham was also charged with violating Rules 3.1 and 8.4(d), Minnesota 
Rules of Professional Conduct.  In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d at 314–15; MINN. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1, 8.4(d).  Rule 8.2(a) deals with false statements or statements made 
with reckless disregard for the truth about judges and other public officials.  In re Graham, 
453 N.W.2d at 315, 324; MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.2(a). 
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plied to actual malice in criminal or civil defamation actions.252  Other courts 
have come to a similar conclusion, finding that an objective standard is ap-
plicable under these circumstances.253 
In In re Graham, an attorney’s immunity under the First Amendment 
was limited based on the nature of a disciplinary proceeding because the 
interests protected by “regular” legal proceedings for defamation and attor-
ney disciplinary proceedings are not the same.254  The Supreme Court of 
Minnesota cited the distinction made by the Supreme Court of Indiana: 
Defamation is a wrong directed against an individual and the rem-
edy is a personal redress of this wrong.  On the other hand, the 
  
 252. In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d at 322.  Normally, the First Amendment provides limited 
immunity from civil or criminal defamation when public officials are criticized for their offi-
cial conduct.  Id. at 320 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80, 282–83 
(1964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
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[are] made with ‘actual malice,’” requiring “knowledge that the statements were false or made 
with reckless disregard [for] their truth or falsity.”  In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d at 320 (quoting 
N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279–80).  The court did not, however, address whether Graham’s 
statements were protected by absolute immunity.  See id. at 319–20.  Given the specific nature 
of the disciplinary complaint, and the fact that it deals with a special population of public 
officials with a specific rule of professional conduct connected thereto, absolute immunity was 
likely not an appropriate consideration.  See id. 
 253. U.S. Dist. Court v. Sandlin, 12 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Green, 11 P.3d 
1078, 1084, 1086 n.7 (Colo. 2000) (per curiam) (en banc) (stating “‘the inquiry focuses on 
whether the attorney had a reasonable factual basis for making the statements’” that the “judge 
was ‘drunk on the bench’” (quoting Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 
1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1995))); In re Cobb, 838 N.E.2d 1197, 1212 (Mass. 2005) (noting a 
majority of states that have considered this question have expressed “the standard [a]s whether 
the attorney had an objectively reasonable basis for making the statements”); see also Gentile 
v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991) (“[L]awyers in pending cases [are] subject to 
ethical restrictions on speech to which an ordinary citizen would not be” (citing In re Sawyer, 
360 U.S. 622, 646–47 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring))).  The Supreme Court also stated that 
lawyers in these circumstances “may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that 
established for regulation of” other protected speech under the First Amendment.  Gentile, 501 
U.S. at 1074; see also U.S. Const. amend. I.  While In re Green focused on the application of 
First Amendment protection to an attorney’s opinions about a judge, which were conveyed to 
that judge, including the fact that the attorney believed the judge to be racist, the court also 
stated that it “neither condone[d] the tone of . . . [the] letters nor agree[d] with the conclusions 
. . . he drew.”  In re Green, 11 P.3d at 1086–87; see also U.S. Const. amend. I.  It bears con-
sidering whether Green’s actions may have been subject to different treatment under enforce-
able professionalism standards instead of First Amendment defamation protection when only 
the tone and nature of his conduct might be at issue.  See In re Green, 11 P.3d at 1086–87; see 
also U.S. Const. amend. I. 
 254. See In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d at 321–22 (quoting In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95 
(Ind. 1979) (per curiam)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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Code of Professional Responsibility encompasses a much broader 
spectrum of protection.  Professional misconduct, although it may 
directly affect an individual, is not punished for the benefit of the 
affected person; the wrong is against society as a whole, the 
preservation of a fair, impartial judicial system, and the system of 
justice as it has evolved for generations.255 
While recognizing that the regulation of professional conduct has dif-
ferent goals, creating a way to balance those goals is slightly different than 
the justification usually given for permitting absolute immunity for civil lia-
bility.256  This becomes increasingly relevant when the conduct at issue is not 
a direct violation of the rules of professional conduct as it was in In re Gra-
ham.257  Where professionalism itself is enforceable, the courts should con-
sider adopting a qualification of absolute immunity and not permitting the 
use of immunity unless an attorney can satisfy an objective standard that 
considers what a reasonable attorney would have done in the same circum-
stance.  Similar to Louisiana’s application of the privilege, it could require 
that an attorney demonstrate the “statement [was] material . . . , made with 
probable cause, and [that it was, in fact, made] without malice.”258 
Absolute immunity is not going away.  While some federal rules and 
qualifications imposed upon such immunity have created limits, the reality is 
that attorneys will always have unfettered discretion to act in a manner that 
  
 255. See In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d at 322 (quoting In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d at 95).  Inter-
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may be dishonest and harmful to a third party under certain circumstances.259  
This has always been an accepted part of the advocacy system.260  However, 
as more and more states may consider adopting enforceable professionalism 
standards, perhaps this is a perfect time to shift the balance away from the 
broadest reading of absolute immunity, or at least start truly imposing the 
balance that is supposed to be imposed by discipline as an available remedy. 
Professionalism, and the bench and the Bar’s demand for more, may of-
fer a perfect opportunity to finally put some teeth in the sanctions available 
to curb and correct attorney behavior under these circumstances.261  It also 
offers a relatively low threat alternative, with due process, a diversionary 
program (in the case of Florida), and a chance to change attorney attitudes 
and behavior without hampering an attorney’s obligation to zealously repre-
sent a client.  Given these limitations, plus the protection of an educated au-
dience, it may be the perfect way to shape up the profession itself, giving a 
new spin to an old problem and, more importantly, sending a clear message 
to new attorneys about where the limits are for acceptable behavior.  It may 
also serve as guidance for similar situations where what a lawyer could do 
conflicts with what a lawyer should do. 
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